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JURISDICTIONAL HAZE: INDIANA AND 
WASHINGTON’S UNCONSTITUTIONAL 
EXTENSIONS OF THE POSTMORTEM 
RIGHT OF PUBLICITY 
Abstract: Long after they die, cultural icons such as Elvis Presley, Marilyn Mon-
roe, and Jimi Hendrix continue to earn millions of dollars annually. Despite the 
tremendous amount of money earned by marketing the images of certain late celeb-
rities, the laws conferring and governing the postmortem right of publicity are 
varied and often unpredictable. In most states, the right to profit from the image of 
a deceased person depends entirely upon the law of the jurisdiction in which the 
deceased was domiciled at the time of death. Certain state legislatures, however, 
have passed statutes conferring this right on persons domiciled outside of their re-
spective borders, and these statutes may have potentially dramatic effects on 
businesses marketing products incorporating the images of celebrities. This Note 
argues that statutes of this nature are unconstitutional under the Due Process 
Clause, the Full Faith and Credit Clause, and the dormant Commerce Clause, and 
that the postmortem right of publicity should be governed in all states by the law of 
the jurisdiction in which the deceased was domiciled at the time of death. 
INTRODUCTION 
Jimi Hendrix, widely considered the greatest guitar player in the history of 
rock and roll, died on September 18, 1970, at the age of twenty-seven.1 But more 
than four decades after his passing, his estate generates revenues of $7 million 
annually, as his image is still heavily marketed alongside those of contemporary 
entertainers born years after his death.2 Hendrix’s face appears on t-shirts, post-
ers, and even drug paraphernalia.3 
                                                                                                                           
 1 See 100 Greatest Guitarists: Jimi Hendrix, ROLLING STONE (Nov. 23, 2011), http://www.
rollingstone.com/music/lists/100-greatest-guitarists-20111123/jimi-hendrix-20120705 [http://perma.cc
/GUV6-AMVX] (“[H]is legacy is assured as the greatest guitar player of all time.”); Todd McCor-
mick & Mari Spears, Purple Haze Lifted by Ninth Circuit Regarding Jimi Hendrix’s Post-Mortem 
Publicity Rights, MEDIA L. BULL., http://www.sedgwicklaw.com/purple-haze-lifted-by-ninth-circuit-
regarding-jimi-hendrixs-post-mortem-publicity-rights-03-06-2014/ [http://perma.cc/MBB6-E8Z5] 
(“Jimi Hendrix, who is widely recognized as one of the best guitarists to ever strap on a Stratocaster, 
is famous for writing songs such as ‘Purple Haze’ and ‘The Wind Cries Mary.’”); The Jimi Hendrix 
Experience Biography, ROCK & ROLL HALL OF FAME & MUSEUM, http://rockhall.com/inductees/the-
jimi-hendrix-experience/bio/ [http://perma.cc/9F6M-N94N] (“Jimi Hendrix was arguably the greatest 
instrumentalist in the history of rock music.”). 
 2 See How Much Is Jimi Hendrix’s Estate Worth?, FOX BUS. (Apr. 11, 2014), http://video.fox
business.com/v/3458604254001/how-much-is-jimi-hendrixs-estate-worth/#sp=show-clips [http://
perma.cc/AUT5-FQG8] [hereinafter FOX BUS.] (reporting the value of Jimi Hendrix’s estate to be $80 
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Because Hendrix died intestate at a young age, and because of his tremen-
dous earning power, there have been many disputes among his family members 
and alleged heirs.4 The disputes have not only thrown the marketability of his 
likeness into question, but those of all deceased individuals who leave behind a 
lucrative likeness.5 In 2014, in Experience Hendrix L.L.C. v. Hendrixlicens-
ing.com Ltd., the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit issued an opinion 
with potentially dramatic implications for the lucrative business of marketing 
                                                                                                                           
million and discussing how the estate generated $7 million in revenue between October 2010 and 
October 2011); Jimi Hendrix on the Cover of Rolling Stone, ROLLING STONE, http://www.rolling
stone.com/music/pictures/jimi-hendrix-on-the-cover-of-rolling-stone-20120702 [http://perma.cc/
WWA4-PMLD] (depicting Jimi Hendrix’s sixteen separate appearances on the cover of Rolling Stone 
magazine from 1968 through 2012); Music, ALLPOSTERS.COM, http://www.allposters.com/-st/Music-
Posters_c122_.htm [http://perma.cc/D8NW-Z6X3] [hereinafter ALLPOSTERS.COM] (listing a poster 
featuring Jimi Hendrix’s face on the first page of its music posters when sorted by best sellers); Store, 
AUTHENTIC HENDRIX, http://www.authentichendrix.com/store/ [http://perma.cc/AD9U-EZAL] [here-
inafter AUTHENTIC HENDRIX] (providing hyperlinks for consumers to buy t-shirts and artwork featur-
ing the likeness of Jimi Hendrix from Experience Hendrix LLC). 
 3 Purple Haze Unveils New Jimi Hendrix Lighters, Vaporizers, L.A. BIZ (Nov. 30, 2015, 12:55 
PM), http://www.bizjournals.com/losangeles/news/2015/11/30/purple-haze-unveils-new-jimi-hendrix-
lighters.html [http://perma.cc/5HSL-KLCZ] (profiling companies marketing drug paraphernalia bear-
ing Hendrix’s image); ALLPOSTERS.COM, supra note 2; AUTHENTIC HENDRIX, supra note 2. 
 4 See Experience Hendrix L.L.C. v. Hendrixlicensing.com Ltd. (Experience Hendrix II), 762 F.3d 
829, 835–836 (9th Cir. 2014) (holding that a limited liability company founded by Hendrix’s heir, his 
father, had authority under Washington law to prevent sales of merchandise bearing Hendrix’s like-
ness within the state’s boundaries); Experience Hendrix LLC v. James Marshall Hendrix Found., 240 
F. App’x 739, 740 (9th Cir. 2007) (holding that a company founded by Hendrix’s heir did not have 
authority to prevent the use of Hendrix’s likeness by a foundation started by Hendrix’s brother); see 
also Matt Whibley, Note, Celebrity and Trademarks: Why Courts Should Recognize a Celebrity-
Likeness-Mark, 43 SW. L. REV. 121, 122 (2013) (noting that the estate of Jimi Hendrix has been ex-
tremely litigious against parties who use his image for commercial purposes without a license); 
McCormick & Spears, supra note 1; FOX BUS., supra note 2 (reporting that Janie Hendrix, sister of 
the late Jimi Hendrix, engaged in many legal battles in order to solidify the late guitarist’s intellectual 
property and build an empire); see also Intestate, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 898 (10th ed. 2014) 
(stating that a person who dies without a valid will is said to have died intestate). 
 5 See Experience Hendrix II, 762 F.3d at 835–36 (overruling a lower court’s determination that a 
statute granting individuals a postmortem right of publicity irrespective of their domicile at the time of 
death was unconstitutional); Milton H. Greene Archives, Inc. v. Marilyn Monroe LLC, 692 F.3d 983, 
1000 (9th Cir. 2012) (holding that Marilyn Monroe’s estate was judicially estopped from arguing that 
her domicile at the time of death was California to capitalize on California postmortem publicity law); 
James Marshall Hendrix Found., 240 F. App’x at 740 (holding that Jimi Hendrix died while domi-
ciled in New York and therefore applying New York law in ruling that Hendrix did not have a post-
mortem right of publicity); Shaw Family Archives, Ltd. v. CMG Worldwide, Inc., 486 F. Supp. 2d 
309, 314 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) (holding that Marilyn Monroe’s estate had no exclusive right to profit from 
her likeness because that right extinguished at her death under New York law); Whibley, supra note 4, 
at 124–25 (observing that litigation initiated by the estates of Marilyn Monroe, Elvis Presley, and Jimi 
Hendrix occurs amidst debate about the existence of a postmortem right of publicity for those individ-
uals); McCormick & Spears, supra note 1 (noting that the Ninth Circuit’s overturning of a district 
court decision invalidating the conferral of a postmortem right of publicity to Jimi Hendrix was a 
popular decision among those who did not want postmortem rights of publicity determined by domi-
cile). 
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dead celebrities.6 In its opinion, the Ninth Circuit upheld the constitutionality of 
a Washington statute that grants every individual, living or dead, property rights 
in his or her name, voice, signature, photograph, or likeness, regardless of the 
individual’s domicile at the time of death.7 
The right of publicity is recognized in the majority of states as an individu-
al’s right to control the commercial exploitation of his or her likeness.8 In certain 
cases, that right can be worth millions of dollars if it passes to a famous individ-
ual’s estate at the time of his or her death.9 Most courts have held that an indi-
vidual’s postmortem right of publicity, or lack thereof, is governed entirely by 
the law of the state in which the individual was domiciled at the time of his or 
her death.10 By allowing Washington to confer a postmortem right of publicity 
onto any individual, regardless of where they were domiciled at death, the Ninth 
Circuit went directly against the established body of case law that governs the 
postmortem right of publicity.11 
                                                                                                                           
 6 See Experience Hendrix II, 762 F.3d at 835–36 (upholding the constitutionality of a state statute 
that conferred a postmortem right of publicity onto an individual domiciled outside the state at the 
time of death); McCormick & Spears, supra note 1. 
 7 WASH. REV. CODE § 63.60.010 (2014) (conferring a postmortem right of publicity onto all indi-
viduals regardless of their domicile at the time of death); Experience Hendrix II, 762 F.3d at 835–36 
(upholding the constitutionality of the Washington Personality Rights Act (“WPRA”) as applied to 
economic activities conducted entirely within Washington’s borders). 
 8 See William K. Ford & Raizel Liebler, Games Are Not Coffee Mugs: Games and the Right of 
Publicity, 29 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 1, 10 (2013) (noting that the majority rule 
in the United States is that commercial uses of a person’s identity require that person’s consent); Mi-
chael Mullins, New Fame in a New Ballgame: Right of Publicity in the Era of Instant Celebrity, 45 
IND. L. REV. 869, 869 (2012) (observing that the right of publicity grants an individual the exclusive 
right to profit from his or her likeness); Aubrie Hicks, Note, The Right to Publicity After Death: Post-
mortem Personality Rights in Washington in the Wake of Experience Hendrix v. Hendrixlicens-
ing.com, 36 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 275, 275–76 (2012) (stating that each state has created its own legal 
protection for an individual to retain control over the commercial use of his or her likeness). 
 9 See Experience Hendrix II, 762 F.3d at 844–45 (ordering a district court to vacate dismissal of 
over $1 million in damages); Whibley, supra note 4, at 121 (noting that the respective estates of three 
deceased celebrities combined to earn $400 million in one year). 
 10 See Milton H. Greene, 692 F.3d at 1000 (holding that New York law governed the postmortem 
right of publicity for Marilyn Monroe because she was domiciled in New York at the time of death); 
Experience Hendrix, L.L.C. v. HendrixLicensing.com, Ltd. (Experience Hendrix I), 766 F. Supp. 2d 
1122, 1139–40 (W.D. Wash. 2011), rev’d en banc, 762 F.3d 829 (ruling that New York law governed 
the postmortem right of publicity for Jimi Hendrix because he was domiciled in New York); Shaw 
Family Archives, 486 F. Supp. 2d at 314–15 (holding that Indiana law did not govern the postmortem 
right of publicity for Marilyn Monroe because she was not domiciled in Indiana); Ford & Liebler, 
supra note 8, at 12; Beth Seals, Speaking from the Grave: Postmortem Rights of Publicity for the 
Dead, LEXOLOGY (Oct. 15, 2014), http://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=93910ea7-e973-
446f-8e5e-88708087f4af [http://perma.cc/9TXE-GR54] (noting that almost all courts determine 
whether a postmortem right of publicity exists by following the law of the state in which an individual 
was domiciled at the time of death). But see Estate of Elvis Presley v. Russen, 513 F. Supp. 1339, 
1354–55 (D.N.J. 1981) (holding that, under New Jersey law, Elvis Presley’s right of publicity did not 
abate upon his passing, even though he was domiciled in Tennessee at the time of his death). 
 11 See Experience Hendrix I, 766 F. Supp. 2d at 1140 (holding that Washington’s conferral of 
postmortem rights of publicity to individuals not domiciled within the state at death was unconstitu-
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This Note argues that state statutes that ignore the traditional choice-of-law 
rule and confer a postmortem right of publicity onto deceased individuals domi-
ciled outside of the state at the time of death are unconstitutional.12 Part I pro-
vides an overview of the postmortem right of publicity and relevant terminology, 
the constitutional provisions with which it is most associated, and its establish-
ment or lack thereof in important jurisdictions.13 Next, Part II examines recent 
developments in the case law surrounding the postmortem right of publicity of 
various dead celebrities as state legislatures have passed statutes attempting to 
modify the traditional choice-of-law rule governing that right.14 Finally, Part III 
argues that statutes that ignore the traditional choice-of-law rule are unconstitu-
tional and argues for uniform adherence to that rule so that businesses and es-
tates can operate with predictability and certainty as to which jurisdiction’s laws 
apply to any given individual’s postmortem right of publicity.15 
I. FOREVER YOUNG (AND MARKETABLE): AN OVERVIEW OF THE 
POSTMORTEM RIGHT OF PUBLICITY AND ITS  
CONSTITUTIONAL IMPLICATIONS 
The jurisdictional issues implicated by the postmortem right of publicity 
are unsettled and often yield unpredictable results.16 Thus, an understanding of 
the rights in dispute, the relevant constitutional provisions that govern their im-
plementation, and the differences in the governing law in various jurisdictions is 
necessary to appreciate the current legal status of those issues.17 Section A of this 
                                                                                                                           
tional); Shaw Family Archives, 486 F. Supp. 2d at 314–15 (ruling that an Indiana statute granting a 
postmortem right of publicity to individuals not domiciled in the state did not apply to Marilyn Mon-
roe because she was domiciled in a different state at death); Seals, supra note 10 (noting that the Ninth 
Circuit’s reversal of the district court decision in the Experience Hendrix case, ruling the WPRA un-
constitutional, was unprecedented). 
 12 See infra notes 147–213 and accompanying text. 
 13 See infra notes 16–94 and accompanying text. 
 14 See infra notes 95–146 and accompanying text. 
 15 See infra notes 147–213 and accompanying text. 
 16 See Milton H. Greene, 692 F.3d at 999 (observing that the estate of Marilyn Monroe changed 
its stance regarding Monroe’s domicile at death after changes in California’s law); Experience Hen-
drix I, 766 F. Supp. 2d at 1140 (holding that amendments to the WPRA did not grant Jimi Hendrix a 
postmortem right of publicity); Shaw Family Archives, 486 F. Supp. 2d at 314 (ruling that an Indiana 
statute conferring a postmortem right of publicity on all individuals did not grant Marilyn Monroe a 
postmortem right of publicity because she did not have that right when she died); Whibley, supra note 
4, at 124 (noting that the commercial use of a celebrity’s name can be unpredictable for manufactur-
ers); McCormick & Spears, supra note 1 (observing concern among some public figures that deter-
mining the status of a postmortem right of publicity by domicile contributed to a lack of predictabil-
ity); Seals, supra note 10 (arguing that companies should be prepared for unanticipated litigation in 
Washington and Indiana due to those states’ postmortem right of publicity statutes). 
 17 See Milton H. Greene, 692 F.3d at 999–1000 (noting the existence of differences in California 
and New York publicity law); James Marshall Hendrix Found., 240 F. App’x at 740 (holding that a 
Washington statute could not grant a right that New York law declined to recognize); Experience 
Hendrix I, 766 F. Supp. 2d at 1139–40 (observing that a Washington statute attempted to confer a 
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Part defines the postmortem right of publicity and relevant terminology and also 
explains the differences between the right of publicity, copyright, and trademark 
law.18 Section B examines the history and scope of the three constitutional provi-
sions most often implicated by postmortem right of publicity law: the Due Pro-
cess Clause, the Full Faith and Credit Clause, and the dormant Commerce 
Clause.19 Finally, section C explores the history of the postmortem right of pub-
licity in the twentieth century and the evolution of the case law and statutes that 
established its lucrative value.20 
A. Finally Famous: The Postmortem Right of Publicity 
The right of publicity is the right of an individual to control the commercial 
use of his or her identity or persona.21 This right protects an individual from un-
authorized appropriations of his or her likeness in business activities by third 
parties without the individual’s consent.22 State law controls whether such a right 
exists and what protections such a right affords.23 
The right of publicity is fundamentally distinct from the law of copyright 
and trademark.24 Copyright protects the right to exclusively profit from individ-
                                                                                                                           
right that New York did not recognize); Shaw Family Archives, 486 F. Supp. 2d at 314 (ruling that an 
Indiana statute could not fill the void left by the absence of a postmortem right of publicity in New 
York); Whibley, supra note 4, at 125 (noting the continued debate as to the existence of a postmortem 
right of publicity for celebrities such as Marilyn Monroe, Elvis Presley, and Jimi Hendrix); Seals, 
supra note 10 (observing that companies would be best served by educating themselves on different 
jurisdictional approaches to postmortem right of publicity law). 
 18 See infra notes 21–38 and accompanying text. 
 19 See infra notes 39–74 and accompanying text. 
 20 See infra notes 75–94 and accompanying text. 
 21 See Thomas F. Cotter & Irina Y. Dmitrieva, Integrating the Right of Publicity with First 
Amendment and Copyright Preemption Analysis, 33 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 165, 170 (2010) (noting that 
the right of publicity empowers a person to prevent certain unauthorized uses of his or her name); 
Ford & Liebler, supra note 8, at 10 (observing that the majority rule in the United States is that com-
mercial uses of a person’s likeness require that person’s consent); Whibley, supra note 4, at 123 (stat-
ing that a violation of the right of publicity occurs when a person’s identity is used without consent 
and to cause injury). 
 22 See Cotter & Dmitrieva, supra note 21, at 170 (noting that the right of publicity allows a natu-
ral person to prohibit unauthorized commercial uses of his or her image); Ford & Liebler, supra note 
8, at 10 (observing that the majority rule in the United States is that commercial uses of a person’s 
image require that person’s consent); Whibley, supra note 4, at 123; see also Roberta Rosenthal 
Kwall, A Perspective on Human Dignity, the First Amendment, and the Right of Publicity, 50 B.C. L. 
REV. 1345, 1351 (2009) (noting that the right of publicity allows a celebrity to control the use of his 
or her image in situations where the right of privacy would offer no legal protection). 
 23 See Cotter & Dmitrieva, supra note 21, at 170 (noting that the right of publicity exists in about 
thirty states); Ford & Liebler, supra note 8, at 10 (observing that state law governs the right of publici-
ty); Whibley, supra note 4, at 123 (stating that no federal right of publicity exists and that publicity 
rights differ significantly from state to state). 
 24 See Mullins, supra note 8, at 878 (arguing that attempts to analogize the right of publicity to 
copyright and patent law are untenable); Lindsay Korotkin, Note, Finding Reality in the Right of Pub-
licity, 2013 CARDOZO L. REV. DE NOVO 268, 303, http://www.cardozolawreview.com/content/de
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ual works, such as recordings or films, and trademark protects the right to exclu-
sively profit from a brand, such as a corporate logo.25 The right of publicity pro-
tects an individual’s right to profit not from intellectual property that he or she 
has created and that lives on independently of that individual, but rather from the 
individual’s own appearance or likeness.26 Additionally, and crucially, copyright 
and trademark law are both federally controlled, whereas the right of publicity 
remains governed entirely at the state level.27 
The nature and classification of the right of publicity varies significantly 
among the jurisdictions that recognize it.28 Some states recognize the right of 
publicity as a privacy right meant to protect individuals from the emotional and 
psychological damage inflicted by unauthorized commercial uses of their identi-
ties.29 Other states consider the right of publicity a property right, similar to a 
copyright or trademark over one’s own likeness.30 
One crucial difference between the two views is whether that right passes 
from an individual to the individual’s estate at the time of death.31 This right is 
                                                                                                                           
novo/KOROTKIN_2013_268.pdf [http://perma.cc/YM6V-V29M] (noting that trademark law protects 
consumers from confusion as to product brands, and publicity law protects individuals from having 
their likenesses incorporated into endorsements to which they did not consent). 
 25 See Mullins, supra note 8, at 878 (stating that publicity rights do not protect the tangible prod-
uct of a person’s efforts); Korotkin, supra note 24, at 303 (observing that a justification for protecting 
the right of publicity is similar to trademark law’s goal of protecting consumers from confusion). 
 26 See Mullins, supra note 8, at 878 (stating that the right of publicity derives from an individual’s 
“abstract right in the sanctity of his person”); Korotkin, supra note 24, at 303 (noting that the consum-
er protection justification for the right of publicity prevents the use of a celebrity’s image to endorse a 
product without the celebrity’s consent). 
 27 See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051–1129 (2012) (providing protection to trademarks); 17 U.S.C. §§ 101–
805 (2012) (codifying the federal copyright scheme); David S. Welkowitz & Tyler T. Ochoa, Teach-
ing Rights of Publicity: Blending Copyright and Trademark, Common Law and Statutes, and Domes-
tic and Foreign Law, 52 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 905, 906–07 (2008) (noting the absence of a federal right of 
publicity). 
 28 See 2 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, THE RIGHTS OF PUBLICITY AND PRIVACY § 11:15 at 710 (2d ed. 
2014) (exploring statutory attempts to enforce statutorily-created postmortem rights of publicity in 
jurisdictions that do not recognize such rights for individuals domiciled there); Cotter & Dmitrieva, 
supra note 21, at 171 (noting that some jurisdictions view publicity as a privacy right and others view 
it as a property right); Hicks, supra note 8, at 279–80 (same); Whibley, supra note 4, at 124 (same). 
 29 See Cotter & Dmitrieva, supra note 21, at 170 (noting that one strand of the right of publicity 
derives from privacy law); Hicks, supra note 8, at 279 (stating that courts have historically focused on 
the indignity or mental trauma associated with the unauthorized use of someone’s identity); Whibley, 
supra note 4, at 124 (observing that some states consider the right of publicity as a privacy right). 
Most notable among these states is New York. See Cotter & Dmitrieva, supra note 21, at 172; 
Whibley, supra note 4, at 123. 
 30 See Cotter & Dmitrieva, supra note 21, at 172 (observing that some states consider the right of 
publicity to be assignable and transferable); Hicks, supra note 8, at 280 (noting that the right of pub-
licity is recognized in some states as a property right that encompasses the same rights and attributes 
as tangible property); Whibley, supra note 4, at 124 (commenting that some states consider the right 
of publicity to be an economic right). 
 31 See Cotter & Dmitrieva, supra note 21, at 172 (observing that states that view publicity as a 
property right typically recognize a postmortem right of publicity); Shannon Flynn Smith, Comment, 
2016] Limiting Unconstitutional Expansions of Postmortem Publicity Rights 303 
commonly referred to as the postmortem right of publicity.32 Under the “privacy 
right” view, the right of publicity is inherently tied to the individual and therefore 
cannot be passed to the estate any more than an individual’s right of privacy 
could be left to his or her heirs.33 Under the “property right” view, the right of 
publicity is intellectual property with commercial value that passes into the es-
tate along with the individual’s other tangible and intangible possessions.34 
In determining which state’s law to follow in cases involving the postmor-
tem right of publicity, the vast majority of courts apply the law of the jurisdiction 
in which the deceased individual was domiciled at the time of death.35 In estate 
law, when a person dies, courts generally apply the law of the deceased’s domi-
cile to all of the property in the estate, as this approach is the most convenient for 
the estate’s administrator and ensures that a consistent body of law applies to the 
estate.36 Therefore, whether an individual leaves behind a postmortem right 
                                                                                                                           
If It Looks Like Tupac, Walks Like Tupac, and Raps Like Tupac, It’s Probably Tupac: Virtual Cloning 
and Postmortem Right-of-Publicity Implications, 2013 MICH. ST. L. REV. 1719, 1733 (discussing how 
states that consider the right of publicity to be a property right tend to recognize a postmortem right of 
publicity); Whibley, supra note 4, at 125 (observing the continued debate as to the existence of post-
mortem rights of publicity for certain celebrities); Seals, supra note 10 (noting the jurisdictional dif-
ferences in postmortem right of publicity law). 
 32 See Smith, supra note 31, at 1733 (observing that states that recognize a postmortem right of 
publicity allow the postmortem rights holder to control the use of an artist’s likeness even after the 
individual is dead); Seals, supra note 10 (noting that the majority of states in the United States that 
recognize a right of publicity extend the right postmortem). 
 33 See Cotter & Dmitrieva, supra note 21, at 172 n.34 (observing that states that view publicity 
rights as part of privacy law do not recognize a postmortem right of publicity); Hicks, supra note 8, at 
280 (noting that states that consider the right of publicity as a privacy right are less likely to recognize 
postmortem rights of publicity). 
 34 See 2 MCCARTHY, supra note 28, § 11:15 at 708 (observing that because Florida law treated 
the right of publicity as personal property, Tennessee Williams’s right of publicity passed to his estate 
because he was domiciled in Florida when he died); Cotter & Dmitrieva, supra note 21, at 172 (com-
menting that states that consider publicity a property right hold that it continues for a period after 
death); Hicks, supra note 8, at 280 (noting that states that consider the right of publicity to be personal 
property tend to view the right of publicity as transferrable to others, including heirs and entities after 
an individual’s death). 
 35 See, e.g., Cairns v. Franklin Mint Co., 292 F.3d 1139, 1147 (9th Cir. 2002) (applying the law of 
the domicile of Princess Diana, which was Great Britain); Rogers v. Grimaldi, 875 F.2d 994, 1002 (2d 
Cir. 1989) (applying the law of the domicile of Ginger Rogers, which was Oregon); Acme Circus 
Operating Co. v. Kuperstock, 711 F.2d 1538, 1541 (11th Cir. 1983) (applying the law of the domicile 
of Clyde Beatty, which was California); see also Milton H. Greene, 692 F.3d at 1000 (holding that 
Marilyn Monroe’s domicile at the time of her death determined her postmortem rights of publicity); 
Experience Hendrix I, 766 F. Supp. 2d at 1137 (noting that virtually all courts have applied the law of 
the deceased’s domicile to determine whether a right of publicity descended); 2 MCCARTHY, supra 
note 28, § 11:15 at 701–02 (observing that most states apply the law of the deceased’s domicile to 
determine whether the individual has a postmortem right of publicity); Ford & Liebler, supra note 8, 
at 12 (same); Smith, supra note 31, at 1740 (same); Seals, supra note 10 (same). But see Russen, 513 
F. Supp. at 1354–55 (holding that, under New Jersey law, Elvis Presley’s right of publicity did not 
abate upon his passing, even though he was domiciled in Tennessee at the time of his death). 
 36 See 2 MCCARTHY, supra note 28, § 11:15 at 706 (providing examples of courts choosing to 
apply the law of the deceased’s domicile in postmortem right of publicity disputes); Ford & Liebler, 
304 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 57:297 
of publicity is a function of whether his or her domicile state recognizes the 
right of publicity as a piece of property that passes into the deceased’s estate 
at death.37 Domicile usually means the one and only home to which a person 
always intends to return, irrespective of the number of residences he or she 
may maintain.38 
B. Full Faith and Credit Due to the Eternally Dormant: How the 
Constitution Influences Postmortem Right of Publicity Choice of Law 
Choice-of-law questions involving the postmortem right of publicity invoke 
possible constitutional concerns.39 One major concern involves the predictability 
of the laws applied and invokes the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process 
Clause as well as the Full Faith and Credit Clause.40 Courts have consistently 
applied the law of the deceased’s domicile state so that any person concerned 
with determining the existence or absence of a postmortem right of publicity has 
proper notice of how courts will make that determination.41 Such notice, howev-
                                                                                                                           
supra note 8, at 12 (observing that the right of publicity is usually understood as a property right); 
Hicks, supra note 8, at 280 (noting that courts generally apply the law of the state in which the indi-
vidual was domiciled in order to avoid conflict by applying different state laws to pieces of property 
belonging to the estate). 
 37 See 2 MCCARTHY, supra note 28, § 11:15 at 701–02 (noting that almost all courts follow the 
rule that whether a postmortem right of publicity exists is determined by the law of the state of the 
individual’s domicile at the time of death); Hicks, supra note 8, at 280 (observing that the traditional 
rule is for courts to look to the law of the state where the individual is domiciled at the time of death 
when deciding whether a postmortem right of publicity passes into the individual’s estate); Whibley, 
supra note 4, at 124 (discussing how Marilyn Monroe’s estate argued that she was domiciled in Cali-
fornia, rather than New York, at the time of her death so that her right of publicity would have passed 
into her estate). 
 38 See Kanter v. Warner-Lambert Co., 265 F.3d 853, 857 (9th Cir. 2001) (stating that a domicile 
is the permanent home where an individual lives with the intention to remain or return); Smith v. 
Smith, 288 P.2d 497, 499 (Cal. 1955) (noting that domicile is the place where a person has his or her 
“most settled or permanent connection”); 2 MCCARTHY, supra note 28, § 11:15 at 702 (discussing 
how a person’s domicile is defined as the place he or she intends to return or remain, and that domicile 
is used for conflict-of-law purposes). 
 39 See Experience Hendrix II, 762 F.3d at 835–36 (assessing whether a Washington statute con-
ferring a postmortem right of publicity violated the Due Process and Full Faith and Credit Clauses and 
the dormant Commerce Clause); Ford & Liebler, supra note 8, at 12; Seals, supra note 10 (noting that 
the constitutionality of Washington’s postmortem right of publicity statute is controversial). 
 40 See Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302, 320 (1981) (plurality opinion) (articulating a test 
for assessing the constitutionality of choice-of-law decisions under the Due Process Clause and Full 
Faith and Credit Clause); Experience Hendrix II, 762 F.3d at 835–37 (assessing whether a Washing-
ton statute conferring a postmortem right of publicity violated the Due Process and Full Faith and 
Credit Clauses and the dormant Commerce Clause); Katherine Florey, State Courts, State Territory, 
State Power: Reflections on the Extraterritoriality Principle in Choice of Law and Legislation, 84 
NOTRE DAME L. REV., 1057, 1076 (2009) (stating that the application of a state’s law must not be 
arbitrary or fundamentally unfair). 
 41 See Experience Hendrix I, 766 F. Supp. 2d at 1137 (noting that virtually all courts have applied 
the law of the deceased’s domicile to determine whether a right of publicity descended); Florey, supra 
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er, assumes that forum states will honor the laws of other states in administering 
their decisions.42 A second major concern implicates the dormant Commerce 
Clause.43 Because the right of publicity is governed entirely by the states, post-
mortem right of publicity statutes and judicial decisions must not infringe on the 
federal government’s exclusive power to regulate interstate commerce.44 Subsec-
tion 1 explores the ways in which the U.S. Supreme Court has historically evalu-
ated whether choice-of-law decisions violate the Due Process and Full Faith and 
Credit Clauses.45 Subsection 2 examines the history of what is commonly re-
ferred to as the dormant Commerce Clause and how the U.S. Supreme Court 
assesses its potential violations.46 
1. The Due Process and Full Faith and Credit Clauses 
The Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause provides that no state 
shall make any law that deprives any person of life, liberty, or property without 
due process of law.47 The Full Faith and Credit Clause provides that a state must 
respect and, when justice demands, enforce the law of every other state.48 When 
confronted with choice-of-law questions, courts must consider the limitations the 
Due Process and Full Faith and Credit Clauses impose.49 In order to avoid due 
                                                                                                                           
note 40, at 1077 (observing that the Hague plurality evaluated the constitutionality of a choice-of-law 
decision by considering whether it was arbitrary or fundamentally unfair). 
 42 See Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 822 (1985) (noting that the expectations of 
parties as to which jurisdiction’s law will govern their transactions affects the constitutionality of the 
choice-of-law decision); Hague, 449 U.S. at 308; Experience Hendrix I, 766 F. Supp. 2d at 1137 (ob-
serving that the majority rule is to apply the rule of the deceased’s domicile state in determining a 
postmortem right of publicity and that to do otherwise would likely be arbitrary or fundamentally 
unfair); Florey, supra note 40, at 1077 (commenting that because the Hague plurality stated that the 
choice-of-law decision did not violate the Due Process Clause it therefore did not violate the Full 
Faith and Credit Clause). 
 43 See Experience Hendrix II, 762 F.3d at 837 (declining to rule on whether a Washington statute 
conferring a postmortem right of publicity violated the dormant Commerce Clause when implicating 
transactions taking place entirely outside Washington); Experience Hendrix I, 766 F. Supp. 2d at 
1142–43 (holding that a Washington statute conferring a postmortem right of publicity violated the 
dormant Commerce Clause); Hicks, supra note 8, at 286 (noting that the WPRA raised dormant 
Commerce Clause concerns). 
 44 See Experience Hendrix II, 762 F.3d at 837 (discussing whether a Washington statute affected 
transactions occurring outside Washington); Experience Hendrix I, 766 F. Supp. 2d at 1142–43 (hold-
ing that a Washington statute regulated interstate commerce because it affected the sale of goods out-
side of Washington); Hicks, supra note 8, at 286 (observing that right of publicity statutes that involve 
the use of a celebrity’s likeness in interstate commerce implicate the Commerce Clause). 
 45 See infra notes 47–61 and accompanying text. 
 46 See infra notes 62–74 and accompanying text. 
 47 See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (“[N]or shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or 
property, without due process of law . . . .”); Hague, 449 U.S. at 308. 
 48 See U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1 (“Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to the public 
Acts, Records, and judicial Proceedings of every other State.”); Hague, 449 U.S. at 308. 
 49 See Franchise Tax Bd. v. Hyatt, 538 U.S. 488, 496 (2003) (holding that the Full Faith and 
Credit Clause does not compel a state to substitute the statutes of another state for its own when deal-
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process concerns, the parties involved must all have proper notice of which 
state’s law will apply to the transaction, and to avoid violating the Full Faith and 
Credit Clause, the appropriate state law must apply.50 
In 1981, in Allstate Insurance Co. v. Hague, the U.S. Supreme Court set 
forth a standard for assessing the constitutionality of choice-of-law decisions.51 
In that case, the Court upheld the application of Minnesota law to a dispute aris-
ing out of insurance coverage for an auto accident between Wisconsin residents 
in Wisconsin.52 Although Minnesota’s connection to the events giving rise to the 
suit was more limited than Wisconsin’s, a plurality of the Court stated that the 
Minnesota Supreme Court’s decision to apply Minnesota law was “neither arbi-
trary nor fundamentally unfair.”53 To determine whether a choice-of-law deci-
sion is arbitrary or fundamentally unfair, the plurality stated that courts should 
consider whether the state had a “significant aggregation of contacts, creating 
state interests, with the parties and the occurrence or transaction.”54 
The test articulated by the Hague plurality grants states broad authority to 
impose their own substantive law in disputes involving any parties over whom 
they can establish personal jurisdiction.55 The “aggregation of contacts” test 
                                                                                                                           
ing with subject matter concerning which it is competent to legislate); Hague, 449 U.S. at 308 (articu-
lating a test evaluating whether a choice-of-law decision violates the Due Process Clause and the Full 
Faith and Credit Clause by determining if the law is arbitrary or fundamentally unfair); Experience 
Hendrix I, 766 F. Supp. 2d at 1140 (ruling that the postmortem right of publicity of Jimi Hendrix was 
not an area in which Washington was competent to legislate because he died domiciled in New York). 
 50 See Hague, 449 U.S. at 308 (discussing how courts must determine the strength of a party’s 
contacts with a state in determining whether the application of that state’s law violates the Due Pro-
cess Clause and the Full Faith and Credit Clause); Experience Hendrix I, 766 F. Supp. 2d at 1140 
(holding that the WPRA’s deviation from the majority rule in determining the existence of a postmor-
tem right of publicity violated the due process clause). 
 51 See Hague, 449 U.S. at 320 (holding that a choice-of-law decision was not unconstitutional if it 
was not arbitrary or fundamentally unfair); Florey, supra note 40, at 1076 (noting that the Supreme 
Court established the modern framework for assessing constitutional limits on choice of law in 
Hague). Justice Brennan authored the plurality opinion in which Justices Blackmun, Marshall, and 
White joined. See generally Hague, 449 U.S. 302. Justice Stevens filed a concurring opinion, Justice 
Powell filed a dissent in which Chief Justice Burger and Justice Rehnquist joined, and Justice Stewart 
did not take part in considering or deciding the case. See id. 
 52 Hague, 449 U.S. at 320 (holding that the application of Minnesota law was constitutional be-
cause it was neither arbitrary nor fundamentally unfair); Florey, supra note 40, at 1076 (noting that 
the Court upheld the application of Minnesota law to a dispute to which Minnesota’s connection was 
tenuous). 
 53 See Hague, 449 U.S. at 320; Experience Hendrix II, 762 F.3d at 835–36 (applying the Hague 
test in reviewing a district court decision invalidating a Washington statute as violating the Full Faith 
and Credit Clause); Florey, supra note 40, at 1076 (noting that although contacts with Minnesota were 
incidental and unrelated to the subject matter of the suit, the plurality nonetheless stated that it would 
not disturb a state’s choice of law provided it was neither arbitrary nor fundamentally unfair). 
 54 See Hague, 449 U.S. at 308; Florey, supra note 40, at 1077 (noting that the Hague decision set 
the standard for determining whether a choice-of-law decision is constitutional). 
 55 See Hague, 449 U.S. at 317 n.23. Florey, supra note 40, at 1077 (observing that the Hague 
“aggregation of contacts” test bears many similarities to the test for personal jurisdiction); Douglas 
Laycock, Equal Citizens of Equal and Territorial States: The Constitutional Foundations of Choice of 
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evaluating whether a choice-of-law decision is “arbitrary or fundamentally un-
fair” is almost identical to the “minimum contacts” test used to evaluate whether 
the extension of a court’s personal jurisdiction over a defendant would offend 
“traditional notions of fair play and justice.”56 But, the Hague plurality acknowl-
edged that situations could arise in which contacts would be sufficient to satisfy 
personal jurisdiction, but would not justify the application of the forum state’s 
law.57 
In 1985, in Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, the U.S. Supreme Court adopt-
ed the Hague plurality test in a majority opinion and also found a situation in 
which contacts with the forum state justified personal jurisdiction, but not the 
application of the forum state’s law.58 Shutts involved a class action suit filed in 
Kansas by the plaintiffs due to its favorable substantive law.59 The Court held 
that the contacts of both the defendant and the plaintiffs were insufficient to jus-
tify the application of Kansas substantive law to the dispute consistent with the 
Due Process and Full Faith and Credit Clauses.60 Most importantly, Shutts iden-
tified two factors to evaluate whether a forum satisfies the Hague “aggregation 
of contacts” test: the parties’ expectations as to which jurisdiction’s law governs 
their dealings, and whether the subject of the dispute involves events taking 
place within the forum state’s borders.61 
                                                                                                                           
Law, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 249, 257 (1992) (noting that the Hague plurality’s decision marks “the ap-
parent end of all meaningful limits” on state choice-of-law decisions). 
 56 See Hague, 449 U.S. at 317 n.23 (discussing the similar inquiries courts undertake when evalu-
ating personal jurisdiction and choice-of-law decisions); Florey, supra note 40, at 1077; Friedrich K. 
Juenger, The Need for a Comparative Approach to Choice-of-Law Problems, 73 TUL. L. REV. 1309, 
1333 (1999) (“Because of the ‘minimum contacts’’ requirement for judicial jurisdiction, a court will 
rarely lack the necessary ‘significant contacts.’”). 
 57 See Hague, 449 U.S. at 317 n.23 (observing that a state’s contacts with a transaction may justi-
fy that state exercising personal jurisdiction but not applying its own law to govern the transaction); 
Florey, supra note 40, at 1058–59 (noting that contacts sufficient to create personal jurisdiction in a 
state are usually, but not always, sufficient to justify application of that state’s law); Juenger, supra 
note 56, at 1333. 
 58 See Shutts, 472 U.S. at 823 (holding that Kansas did not satisfy the Hague “aggregation of 
contacts” test); Hague, 449 U.S. at 317 n.23 (noting that a state’s contacts may satisfy the test for 
personal jurisdiction but not the “aggregation of contacts” test); Florey, supra note 40, at 1078 (stating 
that the class action is an example of when minimum contacts and aggregation of contacts tests may 
yield different results). 
 59 See Shutts, 472 U.S. at 801 (observing that although a small fraction of the plaintiffs lived in 
Kansas and the defendant conducted some of its business operations in Kansas, the dispute underlying 
the lawsuit concerned events taking place almost entirely outside of Kansas’s borders); Florey, supra 
note 40, at 1078 (noting that Shutts involved claims by 28,100 class members entitled to royalties on 
oil and gas leases, and that the large majority of the leases concerned property outside the state). 
 60 See Shutts, 472 U.S. at 823 (holding that although the defendant’s business operations in Kansas 
satisfied the minimum contacts personal jurisdiction test, they did not satisfy the aggregation of contacts 
test); Florey, supra note 40, at 1078 (noting that the state court could not, consistent with the Due 
Process and Full Faith and Credit Clauses, apply the forum state’s law). 
 61 See Shutts, 472 U.S. at 822–23 (ruling that the application of Kansas law on the facts at hand 
was unconstitutional under these two factors); Florey, supra note 40, at 1079. 
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2. The Dormant Commerce Clause 
The Commerce Clause authorizes Congress to regulate commerce among 
the states.62 Implicit in this authorization is the power to prevent state actions 
that affect interstate commerce.63 This power is known as the “dormant Com-
merce Clause” and serves to prevent states from interfering with Congress’ pow-
er to regulate interstate commerce.64 
Courts use two different tests when considering dormant Commerce Clause 
challenges to state laws.65 State laws that only incidentally burden interstate 
commerce are subject to a lower level of scrutiny.66 Under this lower level of 
scrutiny, courts apply a balancing test first articulated in 1970 by the U.S. Su-
preme Court in Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc.67 In contrast, laws that in effect regu-
late or discriminate against interstate commerce are subject to strict scrutiny, 
even if the state law is facially neutral.68 To avoid review under strict scrutiny 
and its heightened probability of a finding of unconstitutionality, the challenged 
law must therefore not directly regulate or discriminate against interstate com-
merce.69 
                                                                                                                           
 62 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (“Congress shall have Power . . . . [t]o regulate Commerce with 
foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian tribes . . . .”). 
 63 See Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131, 137–38 (1986) (observing that the Commerce Clause limits 
state power to regulate commerce); Lewis v. BT Inv. Managers, Inc., 447 U.S. 27, 35 (1980) (same). 
 64 See Taylor, 477 U.S. at 137–38 (stating that the Commerce Clause places a limit on states’ 
power to pass laws that affect interstate commerce); Lewis, 447 U.S. at 35; Florey, supra note 40, at 
1084 (noting that the dormant Commerce Clause has been consistently invoked to strike down state 
laws regulating economic activity outside a state’s borders). 
 65 See Taylor, 477 U.S. at 137–38 (ruling that the dormant Commerce Clause limits each state’s 
ability to pass laws regulating interstate commerce independent of the intent of those laws); Catherine 
Gage O’Grady, Targeting State Protectionism Instead of Interstate Discrimination Under the 
Dormant Commerce Clause, 34 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 571, 573–74 (1997) (noting that the U.S. Su-
preme Court finds intent relevant but not dispositive in evaluating whether a state law discriminates 
against interstate commerce); Eric Hawkins, Note, Great Beer, Good Intentions, Bad Law: The Un-
constitutionality of New York’s Farm Brewery License, 56 B.C. L. REV. 313, 318–19 (2015) (same). 
 66 See Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970) (holding that a state regulation that 
only incidentally burdens interstate commerce will be upheld unless that burden is “clearly excessive 
in relation to the putative local benefits”); Hawkins, supra note 65, at 318–19 (discussing how state 
laws that merely burden interstate commerce are subject to a lower level of scrutiny). 
 67 See Pike, 397 U.S. at 142 (introducing this lowered standard); Hawkins, supra note 65, at 318–
19 (noting that Pike was the first case in which the Court articulated this lower level of scrutiny). 
 68 See Taylor, 477 U.S. at 137–38 (applying heightened scrutiny in evaluating whether a Maine 
state statute prohibiting out-of-state bait fish violated the dormant Commerce Clause); O’Grady, supra 
note 65, at 573–74 (noting that courts apply heightened scrutiny to evaluate laws that discriminate 
against interstate commerce); Hawkins, supra note 65, at 318–19 (same). 
 69 See Pike, 397 U.S. at 142 (articulating a balancing test to evaluate the constitutionality of state 
statutes); O’Grady, supra note 65, at 573–74 (explaining that the Pike test determines whether a state 
law’s effect on interstate commerce violates the dormant Commerce Clause); Hawkins, supra note 65, 
at 318–19 (same). 
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Direct regulation and discrimination are similar concepts in terms of 
dormant Commerce Clause evaluations.70 In fact, a state law is discriminatory if 
it regulates, either on its face or in effect, in-state and out-of-state economic ac-
tivity differently.71 For example, in 1989, in Healy v. Beer Institute, the U.S. Su-
preme Court found that a Connecticut statute regulating the interstate brewing 
and shipping of beer was discriminatory.72 Because the statute allowed brewers 
and shippers more freedom in deciding what prices to charge within Connecticut 
if the brewers or shippers operated only within the borders of the state, it dis-
criminated against brewers and shippers who also operated in other states.73 The 
Court ruled that the statute effectively incentivized brewers and shippers not to 
engage in interstate commerce, and therefore violated the Commerce Clause.74 
C. Long Live the King: The Estate of Elvis Presley and the  
Establishment of the Postmortem Right of Publicity 
Elvis Presley was arguably the most famous and successful American rock 
and roll musician to ever live.75 When he died in 1977, the marketplace was 
                                                                                                                           
 70 See Healy v. Beer Inst., 491 U.S. 324, 339 (1989) (holding that state legislation violates the 
dormant Commerce Clause if it controls conduct taking place beyond the borders of the state); CTS 
Corp. v. Dynamics Corp., 481 U.S. 69, 88 (1987) (holding that a state statute may not inconsistently 
regulate economic activity so as to affect interstate commerce); Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 
642–43 (1982) (holding that a state statute may not regulate activity taking place entirely outside of 
the state); Florey, supra note 40, at 1085 (stating that a state statute that appears discriminatory on its 
face violates the dormant Commerce Clause); Hawkins, supra note 65, at 318 n.36 (discussing how a 
state law can discriminate against interstate commerce). 
 71 See Healy, 491 U.S. at 339 (holding that a Connecticut statute that affects the pricing of a regu-
lated product in neighboring states violates the Commerce Clause); CTS Corp., 481 U.S. at 88 (noting 
that state statutes that affect interstate commerce by inconsistently regulating activities violate the 
Commerce Clause); Florey, supra note 40, at 1085 (observing that discriminatory statutes are subject 
to strict scrutiny); Hawkins, supra note 65, at 318 n.36 (same). 
 72 See Healy, 491 U.S. at 341 (invalidating a Connecticut statute that regulated conduct in neigh-
boring states); Florey, supra note 40, at 1086 (discussing the Court’s reasoning in the Healy case). 
 73 See Healy, 491 U.S. at 341 (ruling that a Connecticut statute was facially discriminatory be-
cause it treated brewers and shippers differently based on whether they operated outside of Connecti-
cut); Florey, supra note 40, at 1085 (noting the Court’s focus on the extraterritorial effect of the stat-
ute). 
 74 See Healy, 491 U.S. at 341 (holding that because the Connecticut statute effectively punished 
brewers and shippers for engaging in commerce across state lines, it was an unconstitutional regula-
tion of interstate commerce); Florey, supra note 40, at 1085 (observing that the Court in Healy ruled 
that the statute was an unconstitutional control of commercial activity occurring wholly outside Con-
necticut). 
 75 See 10 Essential Elvis Presley Songs, ROCK & ROLL HALL OF FAME & MUSEUM (Jan. 7, 2012, 
12:00 PM), http://rockhall.com/blog/post/10-essential-elvis-presley-songs/ [http://perma.cc/YCH7-
YWDG] [hereinafter ROCK & ROLL HALL OF FAME & MUSEUM] (calling Presley “the undisputed King 
of Rock and Roll”); Dorothy Pomerantz, Michael Jackson Tops Forbes List of Top-Earning Dead Celeb-
rities with $140 Million Haul, FORBES (Oct. 15, 2014, 9:52 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/dorothy
pomerantz/2014/10/15/michael-jackson-tops-forbes-list-of-top-earning-dead-celebrities/ [https://perma.cc
/84TG-9PT9] (referring to Presley as the King of Rock and Roll). 
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flooded with merchandise memorializing the late “King of Rock & Roll.”76 Pres-
ley’s estate objected to many of the unlicensed tributes available for purchase at 
no profit to the late singer’s heirs and initiated a flurry of lawsuits that eventually 
prompted the enactment of Tennessee’s Personal Rights Protection Act of 1984 
(“PRPA”), a statute codifying the postmortem right of publicity.77 
One of the most notable cases that led to the passage of the PRPA involved 
a use of Elvis Presley’s likeness for noncommercial purposes.78 The U.S. District 
Court for the Western District of Tennessee held that Factors Etc. owned the ex-
clusive right to exploit Presley’s name and enjoined a nonprofit’s efforts to con-
struct a statute of the late singer.79 On appeal in 1980, in Memphis Development 
Foundation v. Factors Etc., Inc., the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit 
ruled that Presley’s exclusive right to his likeness extinguished upon his death.80 
The court held that upon death, an individual’s likeness passes into the public 
domain and is free for appropriation by all.81 The court identified the absence of 
any previously recognized postmortem right of publicity in Tennessee and de-
clined to create this right as a judicial doctrine.82 Instead, the court characterized 
fame and reputation as non-inheritable attributes from which other individuals 
could benefit but could never own.83 
                                                                                                                           
 76 See Brittany Adkins, Crying Out for Uniformity: Eliminating State Inconsistencies in Right of 
Publicity Protection Through a Uniform Right of Publicity Act, 40 CUMB. L. REV. 499, 513 n.85 
(2010) (describing early postmortem right of publicity cases surrounding merchandise sales bearing 
Presley’s likeness in the aftermath of his death); ROCK & ROLL HALL OF FAME & MUSEUM, supra 
note 75. 
 77 See TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 47-25-1103 to -1104 (2013) (creating a postmortem right of publicity 
in the state of Tennessee without expiration); Memphis Dev. Found. v. Factors Etc., Inc., 616 F.2d 
956, 959 (6th Cir. 1980) (ruling that Presley had no postmortem right of publicity under Tennessee 
common law); see also Factors Etc., Inc. v. Pro Arts, Inc., 652 F.2d 278, 283 (2d Cir. 1981) (follow-
ing Memphis Development Foundation in refusing to enforce a postmortem right of publicity for Pres-
ley); Adkins, supra note 76, at 513 n.85 (listing cases that led to the passage of the PRPA). 
 78 Memphis Dev. Found., 616 F.2d at 957. After Presley’s death, the Memphis Development Foun-
dation, a nonprofit corporation, initiated plans to construct a memorial statue of the singer in downtown 
Memphis. Id. Prior to his death, Presley had signed away the right to commercially exploit his likeness to 
Boxcar Enterprises and the company believed that it still owned that right postmortem. Id. Two days after 
Presley’s death, Boxcar licensed that right to Factors Etc., Inc., which sued the nonprofit corporation in 
order to enjoin the statue’s construction. Id. The nonprofit argued that because its use of Presley’s image 
was not for commercial gain, it did not infringe on Factors Etc.’s license. Id. 
 79 See id. (ruling that at the time Boxcar contracted with Factors Etc., Boxcar did not have the 
rights to contract away Presley’s publicity rights). The Memphis Development Foundation’s fundrais-
ing efforts for construction of the statue consisted of soliciting donations from the public. Id. Anyone 
who donated more than twenty-five dollars would have received a miniature replica of the statue. Id. 
 80 See id. at 959. The licensing agreement to Factors alone was worth $150,000. Id. at 957. 
 81 Id. at 959. The court stated that protecting the exclusive commercial use of an individual’s 
likeness beyond death would not increase the production or efficiency of the economy. Id. 
 82 Id.; see also Pro Arts, 652 F.2d at 283 (applying Tennessee law in refusing to recognize a 
postmortem right of publicity for Presley because Tennessee did not recognize one at the time). 
 83 Memphis Dev. Found., 616 F.2d at 960. The court quoted John Rawls and described fame as an 
independent motivation from financial gain in cases of entertainers like Presley. Id. Therefore, by 
protecting the right of publicity beyond death, the court would not be continuously promoting creativi-
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Four years after the Sixth Circuit’s decision, and other similar decisions in-
volving Presley’s likeness in various jurisdictions, the Tennessee legislature re-
sponded with the PRPA.84 The PRPA, also known as “the Elvis Law,” protects 
the unauthorized commercial exploitation of the likeness of any individual dom-
iciled in Tennessee at his or her time of death.85 The Tennessee statute immedi-
ately extended protection to all individuals—living or deceased—in perpetuity, 
provided the protected likeness was continuously exploited for commercial 
gain.86 The same year, California’s legislature passed the Celebrities Rights Act 
(“CRA”), a similar statute conferring a postmortem right of publicity within the 
state.87 In the years following, despite jurisdictional differences, more states be-
gan to recognize the right.88 
New York, although home to many celebrities, chose not to recognize such 
a right.89 New York does not have a common law right of publicity and limits its 
                                                                                                                           
ty in the same way as protecting the right of publicity during an individual’s lifetime, while he or she 
can still pursue “creative endeavors.” See id. at 959. 
 84 TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 47-25-1101 to -1108 (creating a right of publicity that does not expire 
upon death for an individual domiciled in Tennessee when he or she dies); Memphis Dev. Found., 616 
F.2d at 959 (holding that Elvis Presley did not pass a postmortem right of publicity onto his estate 
because Tennessee, his domicile state, did not recognize one at the time of his death); see also Pro 
Arts, 652 F.2d at 283 (same); Adkins, supra note 76, at 513 (discussing how the Tennessee legislature 
created a postmortem right of publicity in response to court cases ruling that the late Elvis Presley did 
not pass that right onto his estate). 
 85 See TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-25-1104 (providing that as long as the commercial value of the 
likeness of a deceased person is exploited at least once every two years, the right will never extinguish 
and pass into the public domain); see also Adkins, supra note 76, at 513 (noting that Tennessee’s stat-
ute differs in certain minor ways from the comparable California statute). The PRPA effectively empow-
ers Presley’s estate with the exclusive right to profit from his image and likeness for as long as it chooses 
to do so. See TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-25-1104. 
 86 TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-25-1104; see also Adkins, supra note 76, at 513 (noting that the Mem-
phis Development Foundation decision prompted creation of that right in Tennessee); Kevin L. Vick 
& Jean-Paul Jassy, Why a Federal Right of Publicity Statute Is Necessary, 28 COMM. LAW. 14, 16 
(2011) (same). 
 87 See CAL. CIV. CODE § 3344.1 (West, Westlaw through 2015 Reg. Sess.) (conferring a postmor-
tem right of publicity onto all individuals domiciled in California at the time of death). 
 88 See IND. CODE ANN. §§ 32-36-1-1(a), -8(a) (West, Westlaw through 2015 Reg. Sess.) (confer-
ring a postmortem right of publicity onto all individuals, regardless of domicile); TENN. CODE ANN. 
§ 47-25-1104 (granting a postmortem right of publicity in the state of Tennessee); WASH. REV. CODE 
§ 63.60.010 (establishing a postmortem right of publicity for all individuals, regardless of domicile); 
Adkins, supra note 76, at 505 (discussing the importance of New York, California, and Tennessee 
right of publicity law due to the prominent role of these states in the entertainment industry); Hicks, 
supra note 8, at 278 (noting that the postmortem right of publicity statutes of Washington, California, 
Tennessee, and Indiana were enacted to protect celebrities who lived in the respective states). 
 89 See Milton H. Greene, 692 F.3d at 999 (holding that Marilyn Monroe had no postmortem right 
of publicity because she died domiciled in New York and New York does not recognize that right); 
James Marshall Hendrix Found., 240 F. App’x at 740 (ruling that Jimi Hendrix did not have a post-
mortem right of publicity because he died in New York, which does not recognize such a right); Shaw 
Family Archives, 486 F. Supp. 2d at 314 (stating that New York does not recognize a postmortem 
right of publicity); Seals, supra note 10 (noting that the postmortem right of publicity does not exist 
for individuals domiciled in New York at death). 
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statutory publicity rights to living persons.90 In New York, publicity rights are 
more akin to privacy rights than property rights, and thus cannot be transferred 
or assigned.91 New York therefore does not recognize a postmortem right of pub-
licity.92 An individual domiciled in New York at the time of his or her death 
would have no postmortem right of publicity to pass onto his or her heirs regard-
less of the forum state of future litigation.93 Because of this, whether New York 
law governs the postmortem right of publicity has proven to be the critical issue 
in litigation involving the potentially lucrative rights of deceased celebrities such 
as Marilyn Monroe and Jimi Hendrix.94 
II. MARILYN MONROE NEVER WENT TO INDIANA: EXAMINING ATTEMPTS 
TO ENFORCE THE POSTMORTEM RIGHT OF PUBLICITY 
Over the past fifty years, the estates of deceased celebrities have attempted 
to enforce their postmortem rights of publicity, with inconsistent results.95 On 
                                                                                                                           
 90 Shaw Family Archives, 486 F. Supp. 2d at 314 (holding that Marilyn Monroe did not have a 
postmortem right of publicity because she was domiciled in New York at the time of her death and 
New York did not recognize such a right at the time of her death); David Horton, Indescendibility, 102 
CALIF. L. REV. 543, 544–45 (2014) (discussing the effect of a ruling that because Marilyn Monroe 
was domiciled in New York at the time of her death, she therefore did not have a postmortem right of 
publicity). 
 91 See Cotter & Dmitrieva, supra note 21, at 172; Hicks, supra note 8, at 279–80 (noting that New 
York’s right of publicity evolved from privacy, not property rights). 
 92 Shaw Family Archives, 486 F. Supp. 2d at 314 (holding that Marilyn Monroe’s estate did not 
inherit her right of publicity because New York did not recognize such a right when she died); Horton, 
supra note 90, at 544–45 (observing that Marilyn Monroe’s estate argued that she did not die domi-
ciled in New York so that the estate could potentially recognize a postmortem right of publicity). 
 93 See Milton H. Greene, 692 F.3d at 1000 (ruling that Marilyn Monroe had no postmortem right 
of publicity because she died while domiciled in New York); Experience Hendrix I, 766 F. Supp. 2d 
at 1139–40 (holding that Jimi Hendrix had no postmortem right of publicity because he died while 
domiciled in New York); James Marshall Hendrix Found., 240 F. App’x at 740 (holding that Jimi 
Hendrix had no postmortem right of publicity because he died while domiciled in New York); Shaw 
Family Archives, 486 F. Supp. 2d at 314 (ruling that Marilyn Monroe had no postmortem right of 
publicity because her domicile state did not recognize that right at the time she died); Seals, supra 
note 10 (noting that the estates of Marilyn Monroe and Jimi Hendrix have attempted to use Indiana 
and Washington statutes, respectively, to enforce a postmortem right of publicity despite that right not 
existing for individuals domiciled in New York at death). 
 94 See Milton H. Greene, 692 F.3d at 999 (holding that New York law, not California law, gov-
erned the postmortem right of publicity for Marilyn Monroe because she died as a domiciliary of New 
York); James Marshall Hendrix Found., 240 F. App’x at 740 (holding that New York law, not Wash-
ington law, governed the postmortem right of publicity for Jimi Hendrix because he died domiciled in 
New York); Shaw Family Archives, 486 F. Supp. 2d at 314 (ruling that an Indiana statute did not gov-
ern the postmortem rights of publicity for Marilyn Monroe because she died domiciled outside Indi-
ana); Seals, supra note 10. 
 95 See Experience Hendrix L.L.C. v. Hendrixlicensing.com Ltd. (Experience Hendrix II), 762 
F.3d 829, 835–36 (9th Cir. 2014) (holding that the estate of Jimi Hendrix could enforce the postmor-
tem right of publicity conferred by the WPRA despite Hendrix being domiciled in New York at the 
time of his death because the statute created a right for all individuals regardless of domicile); Milton 
H. Greene Archives, Inc. v. Marilyn Monroe LLC, 692 F.3d 983, 999–1000 (9th Cir. 2012) (ruling 
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multiple occasions, state legislatures have enacted statutes creating or altering the 
enforceability of the postmortem right of publicity in response to judicial deci-
sions concerning the issue.96 Some of these statutes have clarified whether such a 
right exists within their respective jurisdictions, while others have prompted con-
troversy and debate among courts and scholars.97 Section A of this Part examines 
attempts by the estate of Marilyn Monroe to expand the accepted jurisdictional 
reach of a statutorily created postmortem right of publicity and why its multiple 
legal actions ended in defeat.98 Next, section B explores the unprecedented deci-
sion in 2014 in Experience Hendrix L.L.C. v. Hendrixlicensing.com Ltd. by the 
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit to enforce a statutorily created post-
                                                                                                                           
that the estate of Marilyn Monroe could not change its argument as to her domicile at death in order to 
enforce California’s postmortem right of publicity law instead of New York’s law); Experience Hen-
drix LLC v. James Marshall Hendrix Found., 240 F. App’x 739, 740 (9th Cir. 2007) (holding that the 
estate of Jimi Hendrix could not enforce a postmortem right of publicity created by the WPRA be-
cause it did not apply to individuals not domiciled in Washington at death); Cairns v. Franklin Mint 
Co., 292 F.3d 1139, 1147 (9th Cir. 2002) (ruling that the estate of Princess Diana could not enforce Cali-
fornia’s postmortem right of publicity law because she was domiciled in the United Kingdom at death); 
Lugosi v. Universal Pictures, 603 P.2d 425, 430 (Cal. 1979) (holding that the right of publicity did not 
pass to Bela Lugosi’s estate at common law because he had not exercised that right during his lifetime); 
Nobody’s Dead Anymore: Marketing Deceased Celebrities, CBC RADIO (May 25, 2013), http://www.
cbc.ca/radio/undertheinfluence/nobody-s-dead-anymore-br-marketing-deceased-celebrities-1.2801803 
[http://perma.cc/XC4F-CXFM] [hereinafter CBC RADIO] (noting that postmortem right of publicity law 
is a continuously changing patchwork of state law). 
 96 See CAL. CIV. CODE § 3344.1(b), (h), (p) (West, Westlaw through 2015 Reg. Sess.) (conferring 
a postmortem right of publicity onto all individuals domiciled in California who died before passage 
of the statute in response to a judicial decision declaring that Marilyn Monroe did not have a postmor-
tem right of publicity under New York or California law at the time of her death); TENN. CODE ANN. 
§ 47-25-1103 (2013) (creating a postmortem right of publicity in Tennessee in response to a judicial 
decision denying Elvis Presley that right); WASH. REV. CODE § 63.60.010 (2014) (conferring a post-
mortem right of publicity in Washington onto all individuals regardless of domicile in response to a 
judicial decision denying the estate of Jimi Hendrix protection under a Washington statute because he 
was domiciled in New York at death); Experience Hendrix II, 762 F.3d at 835–36 (upholding the 
constitutionality of amendments to the WPRA granting a postmortem right of publicity to individuals 
regardless of domicile); Memphis Dev. Found. v. Factors Etc., Inc., 616 F.2d 956, 957 (6th Cir. 1980) 
(denying Elvis Presley a postmortem right of publicity under Tennessee common law); Shaw Family 
Archives, Ltd. v. CMG Worldwide, Inc., 486 F. Supp. 2d 309, 314 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) (noting that Mari-
lyn Monroe would not have had a postmortem right of publicity under California law even if she had 
been domiciled in California at death because that right did not exist at the time of her death). 
 97 See Experience Hendrix II, 762 F.3d at 835–36 (upholding the constitutionality of an extraterri-
torial grant of a postmortem right of publicity for the first time); Milton H. Greene, 692 F.3d at 999–
1000 (noting that a change in California state law prompted the estate of Marilyn Monroe to argue she 
was domiciled somewhere other than where they originally argued); Adkins, supra note 76, at 524 
(arguing that the patchwork of state laws on the right of publicity conflict); Ford & Liebler, supra note 
8, at 12 (describing Indiana and Washington’s publicity statutes as constitutionally problematic); 
Seals, supra note 10 (warning businesses to take notice of jurisdictional differences in postmortem 
right of publicity law). 
 98 See infra notes 100–125 and accompanying text. 
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mortem right of publicity granted to the estate of an individual domiciled outside 
of the relevant state at the time of death.99 
A. A Picture’s Worth: Marilyn Monroe’s Photograph Defines Postmortem 
Right of Publicity Choice-of-Law Rules from Coast to Coast 
Like Elvis Presley, Marilyn Monroe has remained one of the most famous 
and marketable individuals in the world since her death.100 Product lines bearing 
her image or using her likeness in their promotional campaigns continue to gen-
erate millions of dollars annually in income for her estate.101 Consequently, those 
in charge of Monroe’s estate have engaged in significant efforts to expand the 
postmortem right of publicity and increase the revenue generating power of 
Monroe’s likeness.102 Monroe’s estate initiated a two-part legal strategy in order 
to increase the potential income from licensing agreements.103 First, the CEO of 
                                                                                                                           
 99 See infra notes 126–146 and accompanying text. 
 100 See Pomerantz, supra note 75 (noting that Marilyn Monroe earned $17 million between Octo-
ber 2013 and October 2014). The revenue-generating power of Marilyn Monroe’s estate began with her 
decision to leave the bulk of it to her acting coach, Lee Strasberg. See Elizabeth Blair, Monroe’s Legacy 
Is Making Fortune, but for Whom?, NPR (Aug. 3, 2012, 6:06 PM), http://www.npr.org/2012/08/03/
157483945/monroes-legacy-is-making-fortune-but-for-whom [http://perma.cc/77MC-LC27]. Stras-
berg maintained control from 1962, the year of Marilyn Monroe’s death, to 1982, the year of his own 
death. Id. Strasberg left his majority stake in Marilyn Monroe’s estate to his wife, who contracted with 
CMG Worldwide to manage the estate. Id. 
 101 See Blair, supra note 100; Rheana Murray, Marilyn Monroe Line Hits Macy’s, N.Y. DAILY 
NEWS (Mar. 8, 2013, 12:15 PM), http://www.nydailynews.com/life-style/fashion/marilyn-monroe-
line-hits-macy-article-1.1283155 [http://perma.cc/PEQ2-K99Q] (noting that Marilyn Monroe’s like-
ness serves as the basis for the marketing of a line of clothing at Macy’s); Pomerantz, supra note 75 
(same). In fact, changes to the executor transformed the entity from one designed to execute the late 
actress’s wishes into one primarily seeking profit. See Milton H. Greene, 692 F.3d at 999–1000 (observ-
ing that the estate had changed its position on Marilyn Monroe’s domicile at death based on amend-
ments in California law that made it more profitable for Monroe to have been domiciled in Califor-
nia); Shaw Family Archives, 486 F. Supp. 2d at 313 (noting that an action brought by Marilyn Mon-
roe’s estate arose out of the sales of images of Monroe to which the heirs of Sam Shaw, the late pho-
tographer, owned the copyright); Vick & Jassy, supra note 86, at 16 (observing the aggressive legal 
actions of Marilyn Monroe’s estate in attempting to enforce her postmortem right of publicity); About, 
MARKROESLER.COM, http://www.markroesler.com/about/biography.html [https://perma.cc/VXX3-
PYMJ] [hereinafter MARKROESLER.COM] (advertising the CEO of CMG’s role in passing Indiana’s 
right of publicity statute and vigorous legal tactics in enforcing CMG clients’ postmortem rights of 
publicity). 
 102 See Milton H. Greene, 692 F.3d at 999 (ruling that because Marilyn Monroe was not domi-
ciled in California at the time of her death, her estate could not capitalize on California’s postmortem 
right of publicity); Shaw Family Archives, 486 F. Supp. 2d at 313 (holding that Marilyn Monroe was 
domiciled in New York at the time of her death and therefore her estate did not receive her right of 
publicity when she died); Vick & Jassy, supra note 86, at 16 (discussing the Marilyn Monroe litiga-
tion); MARKROESLER.COM, supra note 101 (claiming that the company that managed Marilyn Mon-
roe’s estate lobbied for the passage of Indiana’s publicity statute so that the company could better 
capitalize on the postmortem right of publicity of its clients). 
 103 See Milton H. Greene, 692 F.3d at 992 (noting that Marilyn Monroe’s estate filed suit after the 
passage of an amendment to California law that would grant her estate a postmortem right of publicity 
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CMG Worldwide, the company that controls Monroe’s estate, authored a bill that 
provided broader protection for postmortem publicity rights than that available 
in any state at the time.104 
In 1994, the Indiana state legislature passed CMG’s proposed bill and 
thereby enacted what many scholars consider to be the broadest and most sweep-
ing state statute governing publicity rights.105 The statute defines the specific 
extent of what constitutes publicity and protects the right of publicity for one 
hundred years following the death of an individual.106 Perhaps most controver-
sially, the Indiana statute also purports to confer the postmortem right of publici-
ty to all individuals, regardless of their domicile.107 
Next, CMG used the statute to attempt to prevent other parties with other-
wise valid rights to profit from items bearing Monroe’s image.108 Two cases in 
particular highlight the legal issues that CMG’s actions have raised with regards 
                                                                                                                           
if she was domiciled in California at death); Shaw Family Archives, 486 F. Supp. 2d at 314–15 (ruling 
that Marilyn Monroe’s estate could not use an Indiana statute to enforce a postmortem right of publici-
ty for Monroe because she was domiciled in a different state at death); Vick & Jassy, supra note 86, at 
16 (describing Marilyn Monroe’s estate’s failed attempt to enforce a postmortem right of publicity); 
MARKROESLER.COM, supra note 101 (describing CMG’s CEO as the primary author of Indiana’s 
right of publicity statute); see also Cairns, 292 F.3d at 1147 (observing that CMG, which also man-
aged the estate of Princess Diana, could not use California law to enforce a postmortem right of pub-
licity for Princess Diana because she died domiciled in the United Kingdom). 
 104 See IND. CODE ANN. §§ 32-36-1-1(a), -8(a) (West, Westlaw through 2015 Reg. Sess.) (grant-
ing a postmortem right of publicity to all individuals, explicitly independent of domicile); Shaw Fami-
ly Archives, 486 F. Supp. 2d at 314–15 (holding that Indiana’s postmortem right of publicity law did 
not apply to Marilyn Monroe even though the text of the statute explicitly included all individuals); 
MARKROESLER.COM, supra note 101 (calling Indiana’s right of publicity statute the most wide-
sweeping in the country). CMG is headquartered in Indiana. See MARKROESLER.COM, supra note 
101. 
 105 See IND. CODE ANN. §§ 32-36-1-1(a), -8(a) (making Indiana the first state to provide a post-
mortem right of publicity to individuals regardless of domicile); Adkins, supra note 76, at 518 (calling 
Indiana’s right of publicity statute the most wide-sweeping in the country); MARKROESLER.COM, 
supra note 101. 
 106 IND. CODE ANN. §§ 32-36-1-7, -8(a) (defining the right of publicity as an exclusive property 
interest in name, voice, signature, photograph, image, likeness, distinctive appearance, gestures, and 
mannerisms that lasts throughout a person’s lifetime and for one hundred years after the death of the 
person); Susannah M. Rooney, Just Another Brown-Eyed Girl: Toward a Limited Federal Right of 
Publicity Under the Lanham Act in a Digital Age of Celebrity Dominance, 86 S. CAL. L. REV. 921, 
935 (2013) (discussing Indiana’s conferral of a postmortem right of publicity). 
 107 See IND. CODE ANN. §§ 32-36-1-1(a), -8(a); Adkins, supra note 76, at 523 (noting that courts 
have refused to apply the statute to individuals not domiciled in Indiana at death); Ford & Liebler, 
supra note 8, at 12. The statute has served as an influence on similar statutes passed in other states. See 
Vick & Jassy, supra note 86, at 16; MARKROESLER.COM, supra note 101. 
 108 See IND. CODE ANN. §§ 32-36-1-1(a), -8(a); Shaw Family Archives, 486 F. Supp. 2d at 314 
(noting that CMG’s claims that the sale of shirts infringing on Marilyn Monroe’s postmortem right of 
publicity under Indiana law was insufficient to justify application of Indiana law to determine her 
postmortem right of publicity); Vick & Jassy, supra note 86, at 16; MARKROESLER.COM, supra note 
101. 
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to the postmortem right of publicity.109 In 2007, in Shaw Family Archives, Ltd. v. 
CMG Worldwide, Inc., the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New 
York seriously questioned the enforceability of Indiana’s statute.110 The central 
issue was whether a postmortem right of publicity conferred by the Indiana stat-
ute was enforceable when the individual in question was not a domiciliary of 
Indiana.111 The court held that an Indiana statute could not supersede the com-
mon law on the issue of Monroe’s postmortem publicity rights because Indiana 
law had no authority to govern that right in the first place.112 Indiana attempted 
to create not only a right, but also the authority to confer that right in other states, 
and in this case the attempt failed.113 
The Shaw Family Archives decision also held that even if California was 
Monroe’s domicile at the time of her death, CMG still did not inherit her post-
mortem right of publicity because California law did not recognize such a right 
in 1962.114 In direct response to this ruling, the California state legislature 
amended the CRA so that it applied to any individual domiciled in California 
                                                                                                                           
 109 See IND. CODE ANN. §§ 32-36-1-1(a), -8(a) (granting a postmortem right of publicity regard-
less of an individual’s domicile); Milton H. Greene, 692 F.3d at 1000 (holding that California’s post-
mortem right of publicity only applied to individuals domiciled in California at death); Shaw Family 
Archives, 486 F. Supp. 2d at 314 (ruling that Indiana law did not govern Marilyn Monroe’s publicity 
rights upon death because she died domiciled in New York). 
 110 See IND. CODE ANN. §§ 32-36-1-1(a), -8(a); Shaw Family Archives, 486 F. Supp. 2d at 314–
15. Sam Shaw was a photographer who had taken many photographs of Marilyn Monroe and therefore 
owned the copyright to them. Shaw Family Archives, 486 F. Supp. 2d at 313. His estate engaged in the 
selling of memorabilia bearing the images of some of these photographs. Id.; see also Smith, supra note 
31, at 1740 (describing lawsuits brought by Marilyn Monroe’s estate against Shaw Family Archives 
for selling t-shirts and licenses to use photographs of Monroe, even though Shaw Family Archives 
owned the copyright to those images). 
 111 See IND. CODE ANN. §§ 32-36-1-1(a), -8(a); Shaw Family Archives, 486 F. Supp. 2d at 314–
15. Traditionally, the common law instructed that the law of the jurisdiction in which an individual was 
domiciled at the time of death controlled any postmortem right of publicity. See, e.g., Cairns, 292 F.3d at 
1147 (applying the law of the domicile of Princess Diana, who died while domiciled in Great Britain); 
Rogers v. Grimaldi, 875 F.2d 994, 1002 (2d Cir. 1989) (enforcing the law of the domicile of Ginger 
Rogers, who died while domiciled in Oregon); Acme Circus Operating Co. v. Kuperstock, 711 F.2d 
1538, 1541 (11th Cir. 1983) (applying the law of the domicile of Clyde Beatty, who died while domi-
ciled in California). Indiana’s statute explicitly states that it applies to all individuals regardless of domi-
cile. IND. CODE ANN. § 32-36-1-1(a). The statute purports to be enforceable over sales of all goods 
coming into the state of Indiana. Id. § 32-36-1-9. 
 112 Shaw Family Archives, 486 F. Supp. 2d at 314 (observing that at the time of her death in 1962 
Marilyn Monroe did not have a postmortem right of publicity in any state, and therefore did not re-
ceive one at any later point despite contrary statutory language). 
 113 See IND. CODE ANN. §§ 32-36-1-1(a), -8(a); Shaw Family Archives, 486 F. Supp. 2d at 315 
(holding that Indiana law could not govern Marilyn Monroe’s postmortem right of publicity because 
she did not have any contacts with Indiana during her lifetime). 
 114 See Shaw Family Archives, 486 F. Supp. 2d at 315; Smith, supra note 31, at 1740 n.58 (noting 
how because Marilyn Monroe died before California enacted the CRA, she could not receive any 
rights that the CRA created). 
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before January 1, 1985.115 Monroe’s estate was nevertheless subsequently un-
successful in attempting to establish her postmortem right of publicity by claim-
ing that California was her domicile at the time of her death.116 
In 2012, in Milton H. Greene Archives, Inc. v. Marilyn Monroe LLC, the 
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit ruled that the “retroactive” amend-
ment to the CRA did not grant Monroe a postmortem right of publicity.117 The 
amendment conferred the postmortem right of publicity to Monroe’s estate only 
if Monroe was domiciled in California at the time of her death.118 This caveat 
prevented Monroe’s estate from enforcing the postmortem publicity right be-
cause decades earlier, Monroe’s estate had gone through litigation to prove that 
Monroe was not a domiciliary of California at the time of her death, but rather of 
New York.119 The doctrine of judicial estoppel prevented Monroe’s estate from 
changing its stance on where Monroe died when changes in the law made it 
more profitable to do so.120 
These two Marilyn Monroe cases illustrate many of the issues surrounding 
the postmortem right of publicity.121 Courts have consistently held that the con-
                                                                                                                           
 115 See CAL. CIV. CODE § 3344.1(b), (h), (p) (granting a postmortem right of publicity to all indi-
viduals who died while domiciled in California); Shaw Family Archives, 486 F. Supp. 2d at 314 (rul-
ing that a California statute did not apply to Marilyn Monroe regardless of her domicile because the 
statute did not apply to individuals who died before the statute was enacted); Adkins, supra note 76, at 
509 n.56 (noting that the 2007 Amendment to the CRA deemed the right of publicity “to have existed 
at the time of death of any deceased personality who died prior to January 1, 1985”). 
 116 See Milton H. Greene, 692 F.3d at 1000 (holding that Marilyn Monroe’s estate was estopped 
from arguing that she died domiciled in California because it had represented her as having died dom-
iciled in New York in prior litigation); 2 MCCARTHY, supra note 28, § 11:15 at 705 (observing that 
the estate of Marilyn Monroe was judicially estopped from claiming that when she died she was dom-
iciled in California, because in 1966 the executor and attorney of Marilyn Monroe’s estate argued to 
the California inheritance tax appraiser that Marilyn Monroe died with her domicile in New York); 
CBC RADIO, supra note 95 (noting that when Marilyn Monroe died, her estate fought to prove she 
was domiciled in New York to avoid paying California state income tax). 
 117 See CAL. CIV. CODE § 3344.1(b), (h), (p) (conferring a postmortem right of publicity onto all 
individuals domiciled in California at death); Milton H. Greene, 692 F.3d at 1000 (holding that Mari-
lyn Monroe’s estate was estopped from arguing that she died domiciled in California because it had 
represented her as domiciled in New York in prior litigation). 
 118 See CAL. CIV. CODE § 3344.1(b), (h), (p); Milton H. Greene, 692 F.3d at 999; Whibley, supra 
note 4, at 124 (“Marilyn Monroe’s estate argued that she was domiciled in California (instead of New 
York) in order to retain certain rights in her publicity.”). 
 119 See Milton H. Greene, 692 F.3d at 999 (noting that Marilyn Monroe’s estate had argued that 
she was domiciled in New York when probating her estate in order to avoid paying tax in California); 
2 MCCARTHY, supra note 28, § 11:15 at 705; CBC RADIO, supra note 95. 
 120 See Milton H. Greene, 692 F.3d at 999–1000 (holding that the estate’s arguments that Marilyn 
Monroe was domiciled in New York in prior litigation in order to avoid paying taxes in California 
estopped the estate from subsequently arguing that Monroe was domiciled in California after the pas-
sage of California’s CRA); CBC RADIO, supra note 95. 
 121 See Milton H. Greene, 692 F.3d at 999 (declining to reopen a factual inquiry as to the domicile 
of Marilyn Monroe); Shaw Family Archives, 486 F. Supp. 2d at 314 (declining to apply the postmor-
tem right of publicity law of Indiana, a state that Marilyn Monroe had never visited during her life-
time); 2 MCCARTHY, supra note 28, § 11:15 at 704–05 (observing that the Marilyn Monroe cases are 
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trolling state law is that of the jurisdiction in which the deceased was domiciled 
at the time of death, even when economic activity allegedly infringing on that 
right takes place entirely out of the state.122 State legislatures do appear to have 
the ability to confer a postmortem right of publicity onto an individual who died 
within the jurisdiction while that right did not exist.123 Therefore, the universal 
test in all states for whether an estate had an enforceable postmortem right of 
publicity was a two-part inquiry: first, the court determined the domicile of the 
deceased at the time of death, and then, determined whether the jurisdiction con-
ferred a postmortem right of publicity onto the individual as of the commence-
ment of the litigation.124 Recently, however, the Ninth Circuit seemed to contra-
dict its own stance on this issue when it handed down a decision in a case in-
volving yet another late celebrity.125 
                                                                                                                           
the most well-known cases in which choice of law dictated the existence or absence of a postmortem 
right of publicity); Whibley, supra note 4, at 124 (noting that Indiana and Washington created statutes 
that recognized an individual’s right of publicity action regardless of domicile to provide estates such 
as Marilyn Monroe’s with greater publicity rights when the deceased’s domicile state did not recog-
nize them). 
 122 See Milton H. Greene, 692 F.3d at 999 (noting that Marilyn Monroe’s estate wished to argue 
that she was domiciled in California because such a finding would confer California’s postmortem 
right of publicity protections onto her estate); Shaw Family Archives, 486 F. Supp. 2d at 314 (observ-
ing that the majority rule is to apply the law of the deceased’s domicile, regardless of contrary statuto-
ry language); 2 MCCARTHY, supra note 28, § 11:15 at 701–02 (commenting that almost all courts 
determine the existence of a postmortem right of publicity by looking to the law of the deceased’s 
domicile); Ford & Liebler, supra note 8, at 12 (discussing how most states apply the law of the de-
ceased’s domicile at death to determine the existence of a postmortem right of publicity). 
 123 See CAL. CIV. CODE § 3344.1(b), (h), (p) (conferring a postmortem right of publicity onto any 
individuals domiciled in California at death); TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-25-1103 (creating a postmortem 
right of publicity for anyone who died as a domiciliary of Tennessee); Milton H. Greene, 692 F.3d at 
1000 (recognizing that California’s CRA did not apply to Marilyn Monroe only because she was not a 
California domiciliary); 2 MCCARTHY, supra note 28, § 11:15 at 705 (noting that California statutory 
amendments after Marilyn Monroe’s death would have applied to her if she had been a domiciliary of 
California). 
 124 See CAL. CIV. CODE § 3344.1(b), (h), (p); TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-25-1103 (conferring a 
postmortem right of publicity onto anyone who died as a domiciliary of Tennessee); Milton H. 
Greene, 692 F.3d at 1000 (holding that California’s statutorily created postmortem right of publicity 
did not apply to Marilyn Monroe because she was not domiciled in California at the time of her 
death); 2 MCCARTHY, supra note 28, § 11:15 at 701–02 (discussing the Marilyn Monroe litigation 
involving California’s postmortem right of publicity); Ford & Liebler, supra note 8, at 12 (same). 
 125 See Experience Hendrix II, 762 F.3d at 835–36 (holding that Washington’s postmortem right 
of publicity law governed a dispute involving the late Jimi Hendrix despite his being domiciled in 
New York at death). But see Milton H. Greene, 692 F.3d at 1000 (ruling that New York law governed 
the postmortem right of publicity for Marilyn Monroe because she was domiciled in New York at 
death). 
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B. The Ninth Circuit Experience: Washington’s Personality Rights Act  
Sets the Rules on Fire 
Washington’s legislature enacted the Washington Personality Rights Act 
(“WPRA”) in 1998.126 The statute codified the right of publicity in Washington 
and provided that the right could be passed onto an individual’s estate, establish-
ing a postmortem right of publicity within the state’s borders.127 In 2005, the es-
tate of Jimi Hendrix used the WPRA to bring a lawsuit seeking to enjoin the use 
of the late guitarist’s image by a third party.128 
On appeal in 2007, in Experience Hendrix LLC v. James Marshall Hendrix 
Foundation, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that the heirs of 
Jimi Hendrix did not inherit his right of publicity upon his death because he was 
domiciled in New York and New York law does not grant a postmortem right of 
publicity.129 Just as the California legislature did for Marilyn Monroe’s estate, 
the Washington legislature passed legislation intended to help Hendrix’s estate 
reverse the decision.130 Rather than amend dates, the Washington legislature 
amended the statute so that it purported to apply to all individuals, regardless of 
domicile at the time of death.131 Shortly after the passage of the WPRA’s 
                                                                                                                           
 126 WASH. REV. CODE § 63.60.010. 
 127 See id. (designating that every individual has a property right in the use of his or her name, 
voice, signature, photograph, or likeness that is freely transferable by any otherwise permissible form 
of inter vivos or testamentary transfer); Cotter & Dmitrieva, supra note 21, at 172 (noting that states 
that recognize publicity rights as property rights allow publicity rights to be transferred and passed 
into the estate); Hicks, supra note 8, at 280 (same). 
 128 See WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 63.60.010 (West 1998) (amended 2008) (granting a postmor-
tem right of publicity in the state of Washington); James Marshall Hendrix Found., 240 F. App’x at 
740 (holding that a company founded by Hendrix’s heir did not have authority to prevent the use of 
Hendrix’s likeness by a foundation started by Hendrix’s brother). 
 129 James Marshall Hendrix Found., 240 F. App’x at 740. 
 130 See CAL. CIV. CODE § 3344.1(b), (h), (p) (amended shortly after a ruling against the estate of 
Marilyn Monroe); WASH. REV. CODE § 63.60.010 (amended shortly after a ruling against the estate of 
Jimi Hendrix); Experience Hendrix II, 762 F.3d at 835–36 (upholding the constitutionality of WPRA 
amendments as applied to Hendrix’s estate in the first case under the statute after the amendments 
passed); Milton H. Greene, 692 F.3d at 999 (noting that Marilyn Monroe’s estate only sought to prove 
she was domiciled in California after amendments to the CRA); Hicks, supra note 8, at 282 (observ-
ing that the Washington legislature enacted amendments to the WPRA in response to an unfavorable 
ruling under the WPRA against Jimi Hendrix’s estate). 
 131 CAL. CIV. CODE § 3344.1(b), (h), (p) (amended to include individuals who died between 1935 
and the statute’s passage); WASH. REV. CODE § 63.60.010 (amending the WPRA to include all indi-
viduals regardless of domicile); Experience Hendrix II, 762 F.3d at 835–36 (noting that under the 
WPRA’s amendments, Hendrix’s domicile did not disqualify application of the statute); Milton H. 
Greene, 692 F.3d at 999 (observing that Marilyn Monroe’s estate had argued against her being domi-
ciled in California before amendments to the CRA); Hicks, supra note 8, at 282 (stating that the 
Washington state legislature amended the WPRA in response to the Ninth Circuit’s holding that the 
WPRA did not apply to Hendrix). 
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amendments in 2008, Experience Hendrix LLC filed suit again in the Western 
District of Washington.132 
In 2011, in Experience Hendrix L.L.C. v. Hendrixlicensing.com, Ltd. (“Ex-
perience Hendrix I”), the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Wash-
ington held that the WPRA’s conferral of postmortem rights of publicity onto an 
individual not domiciled in Washington at the time of death was unconstitution-
al.133 The court held that the WPRA violated the Due Process Clause because 
Washington did not have sufficient contacts to individuals domiciled outside of 
the state at the time of death in order to justify applying Washington law to de-
termine whether that individual had a publicity right that survived death.134 Simi-
larly, the court ruled that the WPRA violated the Full Faith and Credit Clause 
because a different state, namely the state in which an individual was domiciled 
at the time of death, had a greater interest in regulating the issue of whether that 
individual had a postmortem right of publicity.135 Lastly, the court held that the 
WPRA violated the dormant Commerce Clause because the statute purported to 
regulate economic activity taking place entirely outside Washington’s borders.136 
On appeal in 2014, in Experience Hendrix L.L.C. v. Hendrixlicensing.com 
Ltd. (“Experience Hendrix II”), the Ninth Circuit reversed, holding that the stat-
ute was constitutional when applied to economic activity conducted strictly with-
in Washington’s borders.137 The court held that, when applied to the dispute at 
hand, which involved the sale of goods within Washington, the statute did not 
violate the Due Process Clause or the Full Faith and Credit Clause because 
Washington had sufficiently significant contacts to justify applying its own law 
to that particular dispute.138 Similarly, the court found that the WPRA did not 
                                                                                                                           
 132 See Experience Hendrix, L.L.C. v. HendrixLicensing.com, Ltd. (Experience Hendrix I), 766 
F. Supp. 2d 1122 (W.D. Wash. 2011), rev’d en banc, 762 F.3d 829. 
 133 See id. at 1142–43 (holding that application of Washington postmortem right of publicity law 
to an individual without sufficient contacts to Washington violated the Due Process Clause and the 
Full Faith and Credit Clause, and burdened interstate commerce in violation of the dormant Com-
merce Clause). 
 134 See id. at 1135 (observing that Experience Hendrix LLC did not even attempt to argue that 
Washington had sufficient contacts to Jimi Hendrix at the time of his death to warrant applying Wash-
ington law in determining whether he had a postmortem right of publicity). 
 135 See id. (noting that, under the Hague standard, the Full Faith and Credit Clause requires that a 
sister state not have a greater interest in regulating a transaction than the state applying its own law, 
and that the WPRA violated this standard). 
 136 See id. at 1142 (holding that, by granting a postmortem right of publicity to all individuals 
regardless of domicile, the WPRA purported to govern transactions involving that right, even when 
neither the individual nor the transaction had any connection to Washington). 
 137 Experience Hendrix II, 762 F.3d at 836–37 (holding that regulation of economic activity within 
Washington sufficiently satisfied the aggregation of contacts test and did not burden interstate com-
merce). 
 138 See id. at 836 (holding that the WPRA did not violate the Due Process Clause or the Full Faith 
and Credit Clause because the dispute before the court involved the sale of goods using Jimi Hen-
drix’s likeness in Washington and therefore Washington had a sufficient interest in applying its own 
law to the issue of whether Hendrix’s estate controls his postmortem right of publicity). 
2016] Limiting Unconstitutional Expansions of Postmortem Publicity Rights 321 
violate the dormant Commerce Clause because the dispute before the court did 
not involve transactions occurring entirely outside of Washington.139 The Ninth 
Circuit declined to decide whether the application of the WPRA to transactions 
taking place wholly outside Washington would violate the Due Process Clause, 
the Full Faith and Credit Clause, or the dormant Commerce Clause.140 
The Ninth Circuit’s holding marked the first time that a court upheld and 
enforced a statute that conferred postmortem rights of publicity onto an individ-
ual domiciled outside a state’s borders.141 This view contrasts with the Ninth 
Circuit’s own decision in Milton H. Greene.142 In Milton H. Greene, the court 
seemed unwilling to even consider enforcing California’s statute to any econom-
ic activity at all because Monroe was not domiciled there at the time of her 
death.143 In Experience Hendrix II, the Ninth Circuit appeared to recognize a 
statutory exception to the traditional rule of enforcing the law of the deceased’s 
domicile.144  
If another state’s legislature passes a statute similar to the WPRA, the Ninth 
Circuit’s decision implies that if the economic activity in question occurs solely 
within the state purporting to grant a postmortem right restricting that activity, 
the statute can entirely negate the relevance of the deceased’s domicile.145 If oth-
er circuits adopt the Ninth Circuit’s logic as applied to similar statutes already 
                                                                                                                           
 139 See id. at 837 (ruling that use of the WPRA to resolve the controversy before the court did not 
violate the dormant Commerce Clause because the dispute involved the sale of goods within Wash-
ington). 
 140 Id. at 836 (stating that although the WPRA raised difficult questions about whether other 
states must enforce the postmortem right of publicity the statute creates, the court need not answer 
those questions). 
 141 See id. at 835–36 (noting that the constitutionality of the WPRA as applied to economic activi-
ty occurring outside Washington’s borders was still uncertain); Ford & Liebler, supra note 8, at 12 
(observing that the district court ruled the WPRA unconstitutional); Seals, supra note 10 (stating that 
the Ninth Circuit’s ruling on the WPRA’s constitutionality changed the landscape of postmortem right 
of publicity law). 
 142 See Experience Hendrix II, 762 F.3d at 835–36 (allowing application of Washington postmor-
tem right of publicity law to an individual domiciled outside Washington at the time of death); Milton 
H. Greene, 692 F.3d at 1000 (applying the postmortem right of publicity law of New York to an indi-
vidual domiciled there at death). 
 143 Milton H. Greene, 692 F.3d at 1000; 2 MCCARTHY, supra note 28, § 11:15 at 705; Smith, 
supra note 31, at 1740. 
 144 Experience Hendrix II, 762 F.3d at 835–36 (holding that the application of Washington’s 
postmortem right of publicity law did not violate constitutional principles when applied to economic 
activity taking place solely within Washington); Milton H. Greene, 692 F.3d at 1000 (applying the 
traditional rule of following the law of the domicile state of the deceased individual). 
 145 Experience Hendrix II, 762 F.3d at 835–36 (holding that the WPRA applied to Jimi Hendrix in 
the case before the court, even though Hendrix did not die domiciled in Washington, because the 
relevant economic activity occurred entirely within Washington); McCormick & Spears, supra note 1 
(noting that the Ninth Circuit upheld the WPRA as constitutional because the case before the court 
involved commerce that took place exclusively in Washington); Seals, supra note 10. 
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passed or passed in the future by other state legislatures, the implications could 
be dramatic.146 
III. VOODOO PUBLICITY (AND ITS EFFECT ON RETURNS):  
THE UNCONSTITUTIONALITY OF INDIANA AND WASHINGTON’S  
POSTMORTEM RIGHT OF PUBLICITY STATUTES 
For decades, courts and legislatures have struggled with the postmortem 
right of publicity.147 Both have used their authority to create, alter, and restrict 
the postmortem right of publicity and the jurisdictional issues associated with 
it.148 This Part identifies the problems arising out of this lack of uniformity and 
suggests how to solve the problem of confusion surrounding jurisdictional ques-
tions about postmortem right of publicity statutes.149 Section A argues that Indi-
ana’s Rights of Publicity statute and Washington’s Personality Rights Act violate 
the Due Process Clause, the Full Faith and Credit Clause, and the dormant 
Commerce Clause.150 Then, section B examines why a federal statute preempt-
ing state law in this area is not the best solution.151 Finally, section C argues that 
universally applying the postmortem rights of publicity according to the de-
ceased’s domicile state is the best solution to this problem and suggests certain 
jurisdictional guidelines for states to follow when designating that right to per-
sons domiciled within their respective borders.152 
                                                                                                                           
 146 See Experience Hendrix II, 762 F.3d at 835–36 (holding that Washington may grant a post-
mortem right of publicity onto a deceased individual domiciled outside the state if the relevant eco-
nomic activity takes place primarily within state borders); Seals, supra note 10 (warning businesses to 
take precautions against unexpected lawsuits under the Indiana and Washington statutes). 
 147 See CAL. CIV. CODE § 3344.1(b), (h), (p) (West, Westlaw through 2015 Reg. Sess.) (conferring 
a postmortem right of publicity to individuals who did not have it when they died); WASH. REV. CODE 
§ 63.60.010 (2014) (attempting to counteract the traditional rule of only applying the postmortem 
right of publicity law of the deceased’s domicile state); Experience Hendrix L.L.C. v. Hendrixlicens-
ing.com Ltd. (Experience Hendrix II), 762 F.3d 829, 835–36 (9th Cir. 2014) (declining to follow the 
traditional rule of applying the domicile state’s law); Milton H. Greene Archives, Inc. v. Marilyn 
Monroe LLC, 692 F.3d 983, 1000 (9th Cir. 2012) (following the traditional rule); Lugosi v. Universal 
Pictures, 603 P.2d 425 (Cal. 1979) (declining to find the existence of a postmortem right of publicity 
at common law because the deceased had not exercised his right of publicity during his lifetime). 
 148 See CAL. CIV. CODE § 3344.1(b), (h), (p) (amending the CRA to confer a postmortem right of 
publicity on individuals who did not have it when the statute was originally enacted); WASH. REV. 
CODE § 63.60.010 (extending a postmortem right of publicity to individuals not domiciled within the 
state at death); Experience Hendrix II, 762 F.3d at 835–36 (making the Ninth Circuit the first circuit 
court to decline to follow the traditional rule of applying the postmortem right of publicity law of the 
state of domicile); Milton H. Greene, 692 F.3d at 1000 (preventing application of California law to an 
individual domiciled outside California at death); Lugosi, 603 P.2d at 430 (declining to find a com-
mon law postmortem right of publicity for deceased individual domiciled in California). 
 149 See infra notes 147–213 and accompanying text. 
 150 See infra notes 153–190 and accompanying text. 
 151 See infra notes 191–197 and accompanying text. 
 152 See infra notes 198–213 and accompanying text. 
2016] Limiting Unconstitutional Expansions of Postmortem Publicity Rights 323 
A. Publicity Rights Made of Sand: Indiana and Washington’s Statutes 
Violate the Due Process Clause, the Full Faith and Credit Clause,  
and the Dormant Commerce Clause 
The conferral of a postmortem right of publicity to individuals who died 
domiciled outside the state’s borders is directly contrary to the well-established 
rule that a person’s postmortem right of publicity is governed entirely by the law 
of the jurisdiction in which he or she was domiciled at the time of death.153 In 
attempting to counteract the traditional choice-of-law rule, Indiana and Washing-
ton’s statutes fail the “aggregation of contacts” test set out in 1981 by the U.S. 
Supreme Court in Allstate Insurance Co. v. Hague, and they therefore violate the 
Due Process Clause and the Full Faith and Credit Clause.154 In addition, by 
uniquely applying their own respective state laws to adjudicate disputes involv-
ing out-of-state interests, Indiana and Washington violate the dormant Com-
merce Clause because they regulate interstate commerce.155 Subsection 1 shows 
                                                                                                                           
 153 See IND. CODE ANN. §§ 32-36-1-1(a), -8(a) (West, Westlaw through 2015 Reg. Sess.) (grant-
ing a postmortem right of publicity to all individuals regardless of domicile); WASH. REV. CODE 
§ 63.60.010 (same); Milton H. Greene, 692 F.3d at 1000 (declining to apply California’s postmortem 
right of publicity law to an individual not domiciled in California at death); Experience Hendrix, 
L.L.C. v. HendrixLicensing.com, Ltd. (Experience Hendrix I), 766 F. Supp. 2d 1122, 1137 (W.D. 
Wash. 2011), rev’d en banc, 762 F.3d 829 (noting that virtually all courts have applied the law of the 
domicile state to determine whether a right of publicity descended to the estate); Ford & Liebler, su-
pra note 8, at 12 (describing Indiana and Washington’s respective publicity statutes as constitutionally 
problematic); Seals, supra note 10 (observing that companies should be aware that they can be sued in 
Indiana and Washington under postmortem right of publicity statutes even if the deceased individual 
had no contact with either state); see also Groucho Marx Prods., Inc. v. Day & Night Co., 689 F.2d 
317, 320 (2d Cir. 1982) (applying the law of the domicile of the Marx Brothers, which was Califor-
nia); Factors Etc., Inc. v. Pro Arts, Inc., 652 F.2d 278, 283 (2d Cir. 1981) (enforcing the law of the 
domicile of Elvis Presley, who was domiciled in Tennessee). But see Estate of Elvis Presley v. Rus-
sen, 513 F. Supp. 1339, 1354–55 (D.N.J. 1981) (holding that, under New Jersey law, Elvis Presley’s 
right of publicity did not abate upon his passing, even though he was domiciled in Tennessee at the 
time of his death). The Russen case predates almost all other postmortem right of publicity litigation, 
including the development of the domicile rule, which until the Experience Hendrix II case was uni-
versally applied. See Milton H. Greene, 692 F.3d at 1000; Groucho Marx, 689 F.2d at 320. 
 154 See IND. CODE ANN. §§ 32-36-1-1(a), -8(a) (conferring a postmortem right of publicity inde-
pendent of domicile); WASH. REV. CODE § 63.60.010 (same); Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 
302, 308 (1981) (plurality opinion) (articulating the “aggregation of contacts” test to determine 
whether a choice-of-law decision is arbitrary or fundamentally unfair in violation of the Due Process 
Clause and the Full Faith and Credit Clause); Experience Hendrix I, 766 F. Supp. 2d at 1135, 1140 
(holding that the WPRA fails the Hague test); Florey, supra note 40, at 1076 (noting that the Hague 
test is the standard for evaluating whether a choice-of-law decision violates the Due Process Clause 
and the Full Faith and Credit Clause); Ford & Liebler, supra note 8, at 12 (observing that the WPRA 
is constitutionally problematic). 
 155 See IND. CODE ANN. § 32-36-1-9 (conferring a postmortem right of publicity that governs any 
commercial activity involving the state); WASH. REV. CODE § 63.60.010 (same); Maine v. Taylor, 477 
U.S. 131, 137–38 (1986) (holding that laws that discriminate against out-of-state interests are subject 
to heightened scrutiny); Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970) (articulating a balancing 
test for evaluating the constitutionality of laws that burden interstate commerce); Experience Hendrix 
I, 766 F. Supp. 2d at 1142–43 (holding that the WPRA violated the dormant Commerce Clause); 
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how Indiana and Washington’s statutes both fail to satisfy the Hague “aggrega-
tion of contacts” test.156 Subsection 2 explains why the statutes unconstitutional-
ly burden interstate commerce.157 
1. Indiana and Washington’s Statutes Violate the Due Process Clause and 
the Full Faith and Credit Clause 
The existence or absence of a postmortem right of publicity is a function of 
state law and according to the majority rule is determined at the time of an indi-
vidual’s death by the law of the jurisdiction in which the individual was domi-
ciled.158 Neither Indiana nor Washington has sufficient contacts with every single 
individual to whom their respective statutes purport to grant a postmortem right 
of publicity.159 Both Indiana and Washington’s statutes claim to bestow a post-
mortem right of publicity upon every individual who has ever lived, regardless 
of whether he or she has ever had any contact at all with the state.160 The “aggre-
gation of contacts” test instructs courts to incorporate all relevant parties and 
events into its evaluation.161 But, for purposes of identifying the existence of a 
postmortem right of publicity, the only relevant contacts are those between the 
state and the deceased individual at the time of death.162 Both Indiana and Wash-
                                                                                                                           
Hawkins, supra note 65, at 318–19 (describing the evolution of U.S. Supreme Court’s dormant Com-
merce Clause jurisprudence); Hicks, supra note 8, at 294 (proposing ways the WPRA could be 
amended to avoid violating the dormant Commerce Clause). 
 156 See infra notes 158–177 and accompanying text. 
 157 See infra notes 178–190 and accompanying text. 
 158 See Milton H. Greene, 692 F.3d at 1000 (holding that California’s postmortem right of pub-
licity did not apply to Marilyn Monroe because she was not domiciled in California at the time of her 
death); Shaw Family Archives, Ltd. v. CMG Worldwide, Inc., 486 F. Supp. 2d 309, 314–15 (S.D.N.Y. 
2007) (ruling that New York law governed whether Marilyn Monroe had a postmortem right of pub-
licity because she was domiciled there when she died); 2 MCCARTHY, supra note 28, § 11:15 at 701–
02 (noting that the traditional rule is to apply the law of the deceased’s domicile state at the time of 
death); Ford & Liebler, supra note 8, at 12 (same). 
 159 See IND. CODE ANN. §§ 32-36-1-1(a), -8(a) (granting a postmortem right of publicity to all 
individuals regardless of domicile); WASH. REV. CODE § 63.60.010 (same); Experience Hendrix II, 
762 F.3d at 835–36 (refusing to rule on the constitutionality of the application of the WPRA to eco-
nomic activity affecting out-of-state interests); Shaw Family Archives, 486 F. Supp. 2d at 314 (noting 
that Indiana’s attempts to bestow a postmortem right of publicity onto Marilyn Monroe were unsuc-
cessful because the law of Monroe’s domicile state governed that right). 
 160 See IND. CODE ANN. §§ 32-36-1-1(a), -8(a) (implying that the postmortem right of publicity is 
granted to persons who never visit or in any way contact Indiana); WASH. REV. CODE § 63.60.010 
(implying that the postmortem right of publicity is granted to persons who never visit or in any way 
contact Washington). 
 161 See Hague, 449 U.S. at 308 (noting that the U.S. Supreme Court examines contacts with the 
state in evaluating whether to uphold the application of the state’s law as constitutional); Florey, supra 
note 40, at 1068 (describing the “aggregation of contacts” test used to resolve conflict-of-law issues). 
 162 See Milton H. Greene, 692 F.3d at 999 (holding that Marilyn Monroe’s estate could not pre-
sent a new argument as to her domicile at her time of death because it was judicially estopped); Shaw 
Family Archives, 486 F. Supp. 2d at 313, 314–15 (noting that whether Marilyn Monroe had a post-
mortem right of publicity was independent of any legislative or economic activity in Indiana, a state 
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ington’s statutes ignore this completely and consequently fail to satisfy either of 
the factors the U.S. Supreme Court set forth in 1985 in Phillips Petroleum v. 
Shutts for conducting a Hague “aggregation of contacts” test.163 
By bestowing a postmortem right of publicity upon individuals domiciled 
outside the state at the time of death, Indiana and Washington’s statutes do not 
satisfy either of the Shutts factors.164 Under Shutts, courts first consider the par-
ties’ expectations as to which law will govern their transactions when they en-
gage in dealings that incorporate these rights for individuals domiciled outside 
the relevant state.165 For the postmortem right of publicity, the traditional rule is 
that an individual’s domicile state governs the right.166 Courts across the country 
have applied this approach for decades.167 Therefore, the only postmortem right 
of publicity law that parties can reasonably expect to govern their transactions is 
the law of the jurisdiction in which the relevant deceased person was domiciled 
at the time of death.168 
                                                                                                                           
she never visited); 2 MCCARTHY, supra note 28, § 11:17 at 714 (observing that courts look only to the 
domicile of the deceased individual in evaluating whether a postmortem right of publicity exists). 
 163 See Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 822–23 (1985) (holding that whether the 
aggregation of contacts between the parties to the case and the state is sufficient to justify application 
of the forum state’s laws is based on the parties’ expectations as to which laws will govern their activ-
ities and how much of the relevant activity took place within the forum state); Florey, supra note 40, 
at 1078 (noting that the class action is an example of when parties’ expectations and in-state activities 
are not sufficient to justify application of the forum state’s law even if personal jurisdiction would be 
constitutional). 
 164 See IND. CODE ANN. §§ 32-36-1-1(a), -8(a), -16 (granting a postmortem right of publicity to 
an individual regardless of the individual’s domicile at the time of death); WASH. REV. CODE 
§ 63.60.010 (same); Shutts, 472 U.S. at 822–23 (describing two factors by which courts should judge 
whether the application of a state’s law violates the Due Process Clause and the Full Faith and Credit 
Clause). 
 165 See IND. CODE ANN. §§ 32-36-1-1(a), -8(a), -16 (bestowing a postmortem right of publicity 
onto an individual without that individual’s consent or notice to the estate); WASH. REV. CODE 
§ 63.60.010 (same); Shutts, 472 U.S. at 822 (stating that the expectation of the relevant parties is an 
important factor when considering whether a choice-of-law decision is fair); Milton H. Greene, 692 
F.3d at 999 (noting that Marilyn Monroe’s estate spent years acting in a manner consistent with her 
having died domiciled in New York); Experience Hendrix I, 766 F. Supp. 2d at 1137 (observing that 
virtually all courts have applied the law of the domicile state to determine whether a right of publicity 
descended); Smith, supra note 31, at 1740 (noting the unpredictability of which jurisdiction’s laws 
will govern disputes involving the postmortem rights of publicity for celebrities). 
 166 2 MCCARTHY, supra note 28, § 11:17 at 714 (noting that the traditional rule is for courts to 
apply the law of the domicile of the deceased individual); Ford & Liebler, supra note 8, at 12 (same). 
 167 See, e.g., Prima v. Darden Restaurants, Inc., 78 F. Supp. 2d 337, 348 (D.N.J. 2000) (holding 
that, although Louis Prima died in a hospital in Louisiana, his contacts there were “minuscule,” that 
Louisiana had no governmental interest in the action, and that the law of Prima’s domicile, New Jer-
sey, would be applied); Joplin Enters. v. Allen, 795 F. Supp. 349, 350 (W.D. Wash. 1992) (enforcing 
the law of the domicile of Janis Joplin, California); Se. Bank, N.A. v. Lawrence, 489 N.E.2d 744 
(N.Y. 1985) (applying the law of the domicile of Tennessee Williams, Florida). 
 168 See Milton H. Greene, 692 F.3d at 1000 (enforcing the postmortem right of publicity law of 
the domicile of Marilyn Monroe at her death because of judicial estoppel); Shaw Family Archives, 486 
F. Supp. 2d at 314–15 (refusing to alter the postmortem right of publicity applicable to the estate of 
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These types of statutes fail to satisfy the second Shutts factor, location, be-
cause the source of the dispute is an event that took place outside the forum 
state’s borders.169 Even if other events giving rise to litigation take place entirely 
within the forum state’s borders, the forum state’s law is irrelevant to determin-
ing whether an individual has a postmortem right of publicity.170 The resolution 
of this dispute depends entirely on the law of the jurisdiction in which the de-
ceased was domiciled at the time of death.171 Contacts between a state and a 
third party, including the deceased’s estate, after an individual’s death do not 
alter where the deceased was domiciled at the time of death or whether he or she 
left a postmortem right of publicity to his or her estate.172 Indiana and Washing-
ton’s statutes substitute the parties’ expected governing law with new rules that 
the parties had no reason to anticipate at the outset of their dealings.173 
                                                                                                                           
Marilyn Monroe); 2 MCCARTHY, supra note 28, § 11:17 at 714 (noting courts’ consistent adherence 
to the rule of applying the law of the deceased’s domicile); Ford & Liebler, supra note 8, at 12 (same). 
 169 See IND. CODE ANN. § 32-36-1-9 (governing economic activity that at least partially takes 
place in the state); WASH. REV. CODE § 63.60.050 (same); Shutts, 472 U.S. at 822–23 (emphasizing 
the importance of the activity in question taking place within the forum state); Experience Hendrix I, 
766 F. Supp. 2d at 1142–43 (holding that the application of the WPRA to the estate of Jimi Hendrix 
was unconstitutional because Hendrix died domiciled outside of Washington); Shaw Family Archives, 
486 F. Supp. 2d at 313 (noting that Marilyn Monroe had no connection with Indiana, least of all dom-
icile); Hicks, supra note 8, at 286–87 (observing that the WPRA was ruled an unconstitutional regula-
tion of interstate commerce because the marketing of a dead celebrity’s image takes place across state 
lines). 
 170 See Milton H. Greene, 692 F.3d at 1000 (holding that the only issue in determining whether 
Marilyn Monroe had a postmortem right of publicity was her domicile at death); Shaw Family Ar-
chives, 486 F. Supp. 2d at 314–15 (same); 2 MCCARTHY, supra note 28, § 11:17 at 714 (implying that 
courts do not consider posthumous activity in evaluating whether an individual died with a descendi-
ble right of publicity). 
 171 See 2 MCCARTHY, supra note 28, § 11:17 at 714 (discussing the traditional rule of applying 
the law of the domicile state of the individual at the time of death); Seals, supra note 10 (same). 
 172 See Milton H. Greene, 692 F.3d at 999 (holding that Marilyn Monroe’s estate was estopped 
from arguing that she died domiciled in California after the passage of the state’s postmortem right of 
publicity statute because the estate had argued in previous litigation that Monroe was domiciled in 
New York at the time of her death); Shaw Family Archives, 486 F. Supp. 2d at 314–15 (ruling that an 
Indiana statute could not confer a postmortem right of publicity onto Marilyn Monroe because she 
died domiciled in New York). 
 173 See IND. CODE ANN. §§ 32-36-1-1(a), -8(a) (conferring upon enactment a postmortem right of 
publicity onto all individuals); WASH. REV. CODE § 63.60.010 (same); Shaw Family Archives, 486 
F. Supp. 2d at 314 (holding that Marilyn Monroe’s postmortem right of publicity or lack thereof was 
established at the moment of her death); 2 MCCARTHY, supra note 28, § 11:15 at 705–06 (discussing 
courts’ reluctance to substitute one jurisdiction’s postmortem right of publicity for another once the 
law governing the deceased’s postmortem right of publicity is established); Seals, supra note 10 (not-
ing the difficulty of predicting jurisdictional choices of the postmortem right of publicity for business-
es in the wake of the enactment of Indiana and Washington’s statutes). These new rules apply retroac-
tively, based on actions that take place after the decedent’s postmortem rights of publicity have been 
established by another state’s law. See IND. CODE ANN. §§ 32-36-1-1(a), -8(a), -16 (providing that the 
postmortem right of publicity conferred under the statute is transferrable according to the laws of the 
state administering the deceased’s estate even if that state does not recognize the rights conferred by 
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For these reasons, Indiana and Washington’s statutes violate both the Due 
Process clause and the Full Faith and Credit Clause.174 Indiana and Washington’s 
statutes violate the Due Process Clause when they are applied to an individual 
lacking sufficient contacts with the state to justify that state applying its law to 
that individual.175 Additionally, these statutes deprive defendants of fair notice 
because the defendants enter into transactions believing they only need to com-
ply with the law of the deceased’s domicile state and therefore violate the Due 
Process Clause.176 Furthermore, the statutes attempt to supplant the valid law of 
other jurisdictions, attempts that violate the Full Faith and Credit Clause.177 
                                                                                                                           
Indiana statute); WASH. REV. CODE § 63.60.010 (conferring a postmortem right of publicity onto all 
persons, regardless of when they die or where they are domiciled at death). 
 174 See supra notes 158–173 and accompanying text. 
 175 See IND. CODE ANN. §§ 32-36-1-1(a), -8(a), -16 (bestowing a postmortem right of publicity 
onto the estate of an individual regardless of that individual’s contacts with the state); WASH. REV. 
CODE § 63.60.010 (same); Shutts, 472 U.S. at 823 (identifying factors for use in applying the “aggre-
gation of contacts” test); Hague, 449 U.S. at 308 (articulating the “aggregation of contacts” test for 
evaluating the constitutionality of a choice-of-law decision under the Due Process Clause and the Full 
Faith and Credit Clause); Milton H. Greene, 692 F.3d at 999–1000 (holding that California law did 
not govern whether Marilyn Monroe had a postmortem right of publicity); Experience Hendrix I, 766 
F. Supp. 2d at 1139–40 (ruling that the WPRA did not determine whether Jimi Hendrix had a post-
mortem right of publicity because he died domiciled in New York); Shaw Family Archives, 486 
F. Supp. 2d at 314–15 (stating that whether Marilyn Monroe had a postmortem right of publicity was 
governed by New York law because she was domiciled there when she died); 2 MCCARTHY, supra 
note 28, § 11:17 at 714 (discussing how the majority of courts apply the law of the deceased’s domi-
cile state in determining the existence of a postmortem right of publicity); Ford & Liebler, supra note 
8, at 12 (same); Hicks, supra note 8, at 289 (same). 
 176 See IND. CODE ANN. §§ 32-36-1-1(a), -8(a), -16 (bestowing a postmortem right of publicity 
onto the estate of an individual even if the state administering the estate does not recognize that right); 
WASH. REV. CODE § 63.60.010 (same); Shutts, 472 U.S. at 823 (identifying factors for use in applying 
the “aggregation of contacts” test); Hague, 449 U.S. at 308 (articulating the “aggregation of contacts” 
test for evaluating the constitutionality of a choice-of-law decision under the Due Process Clause and 
the Full Faith and Credit Clause); Milton H. Greene, 692 F.3d at 999–1000 (holding that the estate of 
Marilyn Monroe was judicially estopped from changing its argument as to where Marilyn Monroe 
was domiciled at death); Experience Hendrix I, 766 F. Supp. 2d at 1139–40 (ruling that the WPRA 
violated the Due Process Clause and the Full Faith and Credit Clause); Shaw Family Archives, 486 
F. Supp. 2d at 314–15 (declining to apply Indiana’s postmortem right of publicity law to Marilyn 
Monroe because she was not domiciled there at death); 2 MCCARTHY, supra note 28, § 11:17 at 714 
(noting how courts uniformly apply the domicile rule); Ford & Liebler, supra note 8, at 12 (same); 
Hicks, supra note 8, at 289 (same). 
 177 See IND. CODE ANN. §§ 32-36-1-1(a), -8(a), -16 (granting a postmortem right of publicity onto 
all individuals, regardless of the publicity laws of the state administering the estate); WASH. REV. 
CODE § 63.60.010 (conferring a postmortem right of publicity onto all individuals independent of any 
contact by the deceased with Washington); Shutts, 472 U.S. at 823 (holding that the expectations of 
parties as to which state’s laws will govern their transactions is a relevant factor in determining the 
constitutionality of a choice-of-law decision); Hague, 449 U.S. at 308 (articulating the “aggregation of 
contacts” test for evaluating whether a choice-of-law decision violates the Due Process Clause and the 
Full Faith and Credit Clause); Milton H. Greene, 692 F.3d at 999–1000 (holding that the law of the 
domicile state of Marilyn Monroe governed her postmortem right of publicity); Experience Hendrix I, 
766 F. Supp. 2d at 1139–40 (ruling that the application of the WPRA to the estate of Jimi Hendrix 
violated the Due Process Clause and the Full Faith and Credit Clause); Shaw Family Archives, 486 
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2. Indiana and Washington’s Statutes Violate the Dormant Commerce 
Clause 
Indiana and Washington’s statutes both violate the dormant Commerce 
Clause by regulating economic activity that takes place outside of each state’s 
respective borders.178 Both statutes purport to create a right of publicity for all 
individuals, regardless of where they are domiciled at the time of their death.179 
Each statute in turn regulates the economic activity arising from that right, such 
as the transfer and licensing of the person’s likeness.180 In this way, Indiana and 
Washington’s statutes are state extraterritorial regulations that violate the 
dormant Commerce Clause.181 
Indiana and Washington’s statutes violate the dormant Commerce Clause 
under the discrimination prong, before even reaching the balancing test estab-
lished by the U.S. Supreme Court in 1970 in Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc.182 In 
2014, in Experience Hendrix L.L.C. v. Hendrixlicensing.com Ltd., the U.S. Court 
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit became the first, and to date only, court to up-
hold the constitutionality of the application of either statute to an individual 
                                                                                                                           
F. Supp. 2d at 314–15 (declining to apply Indiana law to Marilyn Monroe’s estate because she was not 
domiciled there at death); 2 MCCARTHY, supra note 28, § 11:17 at 714 (discussing how courts uni-
formly apply the domicile rule); Ford & Liebler, supra note 8, at 12 (same); Hicks, supra note 8, at 
291 (same). 
 178 See IND. CODE ANN. §§ 32-36-1-1(a), -8(a), -16 (conferring a postmortem right of publicity 
onto persons who die domiciled outside of Indiana); WASH. REV. CODE § 63.60.050 (creating a post-
mortem right of publicity for persons who die domiciled outside of Washington); Healy v. Beer Inst., 
491 U.S. 324, 339 (1989) (holding that legislation violates the dormant Commerce Clause if its practi-
cal effect is to control conduct beyond the boundaries of the state); Experience Hendrix I, 766 
F. Supp. 2d at 1142–43. 
 179 See IND. CODE ANN. §§ 32-36-1-1(a), -8(a) (granting a postmortem right of publicity to per-
sons regardless of their domicile at death); WASH. REV. CODE § 63.60.010 (same). 
 180 See IND. CODE ANN. §§ 32-36-1-1(a), -8(a), -16 (providing that the right of publicity and all 
its associated benefits survive an individual’s death, regardless of where that individual is domiciled); 
WASH. REV. CODE § 63.60.010 (same); Experience Hendrix I, 766 F. Supp. 2d at 1142–43 (discussing 
how the plaintiffs sought to use the WPRA to prevent the defendants from selling goods bearing Jimi 
Hendrix’s likeness). 
 181 See IND. CODE ANN. §§ 32-36-1-1(a), -8(a); WASH. REV. CODE § 63.60.010; Healy, 491 U.S. 
at 339; Experience Hendrix I, 766 F. Supp. 2d at 1142–43 (ruling that the conferral of a postmortem 
right of publicity to a non-Washington-domiciled individual unconstitutionally burdened interstate 
commerce); Ford & Liebler, supra note 8, at 12 (noting that the majority rule is to apply the law of the 
deceased’s domicile to determine postmortem right of publicity). 
 182 See IND. CODE ANN. §§ 32-36-1-1(a), -8(a), -16 (granting a postmortem right of publicity that 
governs transactions involving the transportation of goods across state lines); WASH. REV. CODE 
§ 63.60.010 (same); Taylor, 477 U.S. at 137–38; Pike, 397 U.S. at 142 (stating the balancing test that 
determines whether a state statute violates the dormant Commerce Clause); Florey, supra note 40, at 
1085 (noting the application of heightened scrutiny to laws that amount to either direct regulation or 
discrimination); Ford & Liebler, supra note 8, at 12 (referring to Indiana and Washington’s statutes as 
“constitutionally problematic”). 
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domiciled outside the forum state at death.183 In that decision, the court specifi-
cally declined to comment on the constitutionality of the application of Washing-
ton’s statutes to disputes involving transactions not occurring entirely within 
Washington’s borders.184  
If the Ninth Circuit were to uphold the statute’s reach to transactions taking 
place solely within Washington, the statute would in effect create two sets of 
distinct rules: one governing transactions in Washington and one governing 
transactions outside of Washington.185 Applying a different set of rules to trans-
actions based on whether any of the economic activity takes place outside of the 
state’s borders is effectively discriminatory against out-of-state interests and, 
absent a compelling state interest, violates the dormant Commerce Clause.186 
In addition, both statutes violate the dormant Commerce Clause under the 
Pike balancing test.187 The Pike test instructs courts to balance the legitimate 
local interest regulated by the law in question against the incidental effects on 
interstate commerce that the law imposes.188 The postmortem right of publicity 
of individuals not domiciled in a state at the time of death is not a legitimate lo-
                                                                                                                           
 183 See Experience Hendrix II, 762 F.3d at 835–36 (holding that a limited liability company 
founded by Hendrix’s heir, his father, had authority under the WPRA to prevent sales of merchandise 
bearing Hendrix’s likeness within the state’s boundaries); Recent Case: Experience Hendrix L.L.C. v. 
Hendrixlicensing.com Ltd, 762 F.3d 829 (9th Cir. 2014), 128 HARV. L. REV. 1842, 1842 (2015) (not-
ing that the Ninth Circuit’s decision is a departure from the traditional and previously predictable rule 
determining the existence of a postmortem right of publicity). 
 184 See Experience Hendrix II, 762 F.3d at 835–36. 
 185 See id.; Hawkins, supra note 65, at 339 (arguing that a New York law providing benefits to 
breweries that use specified quantities of in-state ingredients violates the dormant Commerce Clause); 
Hicks, supra note 8, at 294 (arguing that the WPRA violates the dormant Commerce Clause because it 
has no nexus requirement between the commercial use of an individual’s likeness and the state of 
Washington). 
 186 See Healy, 491 U.S. at 339 (holding that a Connecticut regulation that influenced beer prices 
in other states violated the dormant Commerce Clause); Taylor, 477 U.S. at 137–38 (holding that a 
Maine law discriminating against out-of-state economic interests was constitutional because it was 
narrowly tailored to meet the state interest of protecting local wildlife); Experience Hendrix II, 762 
F.3d at 835 (declining to address the constitutionality of the application of the WPRA to activity tak-
ing place outside Washington’s borders); Florey, supra note 40, at 1085 (noting that a state regulation 
that appears to discriminate against out-of-state interests on its face violates the dormant Commerce 
Clause); Hawkins, supra note 65, at 339. 
 187 See IND. CODE ANN. §§ 32-36-1-1(a), -8(a), -16 (granting a postmortem right of publicity to 
individuals who have no contact with Indiana during their respective lifetimes); WASH. REV. CODE 
§ 63.60.010 (conferring a postmortem right of publicity onto persons who never step foot in the state 
of Washington); Pike, 397 U.S. at 142 (establishing a balancing test to evaluate the constitutionality of 
laws that burden interstate commerce); Hawkins, supra note 65, at 318–19 (discussing the implica-
tions of the Pike test). 
 188 Pike, 397 U.S. at 142 (stating that a statute is unconstitutional if the burden it imposes on in-
terstate commerce is clearly excessive in relation to the local benefits of the statute); O’Grady, supra 
note 65, at 573–74 (describing the Pike test’s balancing of the burden on interstate commerce with 
local benefits); Hawkins, supra note 65, at 318–19 (same). 
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cal interest of that state.189 Therefore, even the slightest effect on interstate 
commerce is enough to tip the scale and render the statutes unconstitutional.190 
B. The Congressional Itch: Why a Federal Right of Publicity Statute  
Is Not the Best Solution 
Some scholars have argued that the best solution to these jurisdictional con-
flicts is a federal statute governing all rights of publicity.191 Such a statute would 
serve as a regulation of interstate commerce and therefore Congress would pos-
sess the authority to pass it through the Commerce Clause.192 The touted benefits 
of a federal statute preempting all state right of publicity law would include uni-
formity, predictability, and an end to forum shopping in postmortem right of 
publicity cases.193 
Upon closer examination, the argument for a federal right of publicity stat-
ute is primarily an argument against unconstitutional right of publicity statutes 
such as those passed by Indiana and Washington’s respective legislatures.194 Pri-
or to the enactment of these two statutes, uniformity and predictability were not 
issues in postmortem rights of publicity disputes because courts had unanimous-
                                                                                                                           
 189 See Milton H. Greene, 692 F.3d at 999–1000 (holding that the CRA did not apply to Marilyn 
Monroe because she was not domiciled in California at death); Shaw Family Archives, 486 
F. Supp. 2d at 313 (noting the absence of any connection between Marilyn Monroe and Indiana); 
2 MCCARTHY, supra note 28, § 11:15 at 701–02 (observing that the majority rule is to apply the law 
of the deceased’s domicile state in determining the existence of a postmortem right of publicity). 
 190 See Pike, 397 U.S. at 142; Experience Hendrix I, 766 F. Supp. 2d at 1142–43 (holding the 
WPRA unconstitutional as a violation of the dormant Commerce Clause); Shaw Family Archives, 486 
F. Supp. 2d at 314–15; Florey, supra note 40, at 1084 (noting violations of the dormant Commerce 
Clause through extraterritorial regulation by state laws); Hawkins, supra note 65, at 318–19. 
 191 See Vick & Jassy, supra note 86, at 14 (arguing for a federal statute governing the right of 
publicity); Sean D. Whaley, I’m a Highway Star: An Outline for a Federal Right of Publicity, 31 
HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 257, 260 (2009) (same); Eric J. Goodman, Comment, A National Iden-
tity Crisis: The Need for a Federal Right of Publicity Statute, 9 DEPAUL-LCA J. ART & ENT. L. & 
POL’Y 227, 227 (1999) (same). Some scholars have also argued for a model uniform state statute gov-
erning all rights of publicity. See Adkins, supra note 76, at 528; Richard S. Robinson, Preemption, the 
Right of Publicity, and a New Federal Statute, 16 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 183, 204 (1998). 
 192 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (“Congress shall have Power . . . . [t]o regulate Commerce 
with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian tribes”); Robinson, supra note 
191, at 202 n.130 (noting that Congress’s enumerated powers under Article I of the U.S. Constitution 
include the regulation of interstate commerce); Vick & Jassy, supra note 86, at 17 (same); Whaley, 
supra note 191, at 259 (same); Goodman, supra note 191, at 251 (same). 
 193 See Adkins, supra note 76, at 528 (arguing for the adoption of a model uniform state statute); 
Vick & Jassy, supra note 86, at 14, 16 (using the estate of Marilyn Monroe as an example of forum 
shopping in Indiana in order to take advantage of Indiana’s beneficial postmortem right of publicity 
law). 
 194 See IND. CODE ANN. §§ 32-36-1-1(a), -8(a) (granting a postmortem right of publicity in con-
flict with the established body of case law in the United States); WASH. REV. CODE § 63.60.010 
(same); Adkins, supra note 76, at 524–25, 528 (arguing that a uniform right of publicity would create 
predictability); Robinson, supra note 191, at 204 (same); Vick & Jassy, supra note 86, at 14 (same); 
Whaley, supra note 191, at 273 (same); Goodman, supra note 191, at 251 (same). 
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ly applied the law of the domicile of the deceased at the time of death.195 Like-
wise, without either of these statutes, forum shopping was a fruitless endeavor 
because the forum state would always apply the law of the deceased’s domicile 
state.196 Therefore, when compared to a U.S. Supreme Court ruling that the re-
spective statutes’ extraterritorial conferral of postmortem rights of publicity is 
unconstitutional, preempting these statutes with federal law would provide no 
added benefits.197 
C. A Not-So Slight Return to Basics: The Law of a Person’s Domicile 
Should Govern the Postmortem Right of Publicity 
The only sufficient contact between an individual and a state to satisfy con-
stitutional concerns with regards to conferring the postmortem right of publicity 
                                                                                                                           
 195 See IND. CODE ANN. §§ 32-36-1-1(a), -8(a); WASH. REV. CODE § 63.60.010; Milton H. 
Greene, 692 F.3d at 1000 (noting the established rule of applying the law of the domicile of the de-
ceased individual); Experience Hendrix I, 766 F. Supp. 2d at 1137 (observing that virtually all courts 
have applied the law of the domicile state to determine whether a right of publicity descended); Shaw 
Family Archives, 486 F. Supp. 2d at 314 (stating that the majority of courts apply the law of the de-
ceased’s domicile); 2 MCCARTHY, supra note 28, § 11:17 at 714 (describing the uniformity and prac-
ticality of courts applying the law of the deceased’s domicile in postmortem right of publicity dis-
putes). 
 196 See IND. CODE ANN. §§ 32-36-1-1(a), -8(a) (purporting to grant all individuals a postmortem 
right of publicity regardless of domicile); WASH. REV. CODE § 63.60.010 (same); Milton H. Greene, 692 
F.3d at 999 (noting that proving Marilyn Monroe’s domicile was the only way of being able to enforce 
California’s more favorable postmortem publicity law); Experience Hendrix I, 766 F. Supp. 2d at 1137 
(observing that virtually all courts have applied the law of the domicile to determine whether a right of 
publicity descended); Shaw Family Archives, 486 F. Supp. 2d at 314–15 (stating that Indiana law was 
irrelevant in determining Marilyn Monroe’s postmortem right of publicity because she was not domiciled 
there at death); 2 MCCARTHY, supra note 28, § 11:17 at 714 (discussing reasons in favor of applying the 
law of the deceased’s domicile in choice-of-law disputes). 
 197 See IND. CODE ANN. §§ 32-36-1-1(a), -8(a) (granting a postmortem right of publicity onto all 
individuals, regardless of domicile); WASH. REV. CODE § 63.60.010 (same); Milton H. Greene, 692 
F.3d at 999–1000 (holding that the CRA did not apply to Marilyn Monroe because she was not domi-
ciled in California at her death); Experience Hendrix I, 766 F. Supp. 2d at 1142–43 (ruling that the 
WPRA was unconstitutional because it violated the Due Process Clause, the Full Faith and Credit 
Clause, and the dormant Commerce Clause); Shaw Family Archives, 486 F. Supp. 2d at 314–15 (de-
clining to apply Indiana law to the estate of Marilyn Monroe because she was not domiciled there at 
death); 2 MCCARTHY, supra note 28, § 11:17 at 714 (arguing that the majority rule of applying the 
law of the deceased individual’s domicile state is the only practical rule); Seals, supra note 10 (noting 
the uniformity in application of the domicile state’s postmortem right of publicity law prior to the 
passage of Indiana and Washington’s statutes). A federal right of publicity would also present issues 
when the rights in question are those of an individual domiciled outside of the United States at the 
time of death. See Cairns v. Franklin Mint Co., 292 F.3d 1139, 1147 (9th Cir. 2002)  (applying the 
postmortem right of publicity law of Great Britain because Princess Diana was domiciled in Great 
Britain when she died). Declining to cover individuals domiciled outside the United States would run 
counter to a federal statute’s goals of uniformity and predictability, and granting the right under federal 
law with no concern for domicile would encourage forum shopping from individuals domiciled abroad 
even more so than either Indiana or Washington’s statutes. See IND. CODE ANN. §§ 32-36-1-1(a), -8(a); 
WASH. REV. CODE § 63.60.010; 2 MCCARTHY, supra note 28, § 11:17 at 714 (arguing that applying the 
law of the deceased’s domicile state is the most practical rule). 
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is domicile.198 Universal enforcement of the law of the deceased’s domicile state 
regardless of forum state provides adequate notice to all concerned parties and 
thereby satisfies potential concerns raised by the Due Process Clause and the 
Full Faith and Credit Clause.199 Uniform adherence to this traditional rule also 
prevents extraterritorial commercial regulation and unequal treatment of in-state 
and out-of-state interests that potentially violate the dormant Commerce 
Clause.200 
Consistent application of the law of the deceased’s domicile state provides 
more benefits than a hypothetical federal publicity statute for all parties con-
cerned.201 Although a federal statute might ensure predictability for concerned 
parties as to which law will govern their transactions, adherence to the traditional 
rule allows the postmortem right of publicity to evolve while maintaining an 
established body of statutory and case law to guide businesspersons and law-
makers alike in navigating those changes.202 As technological advances present 
                                                                                                                           
 198 See Shutts, 472 U.S. at 822–23 (identifying the predictability of law and events taking place in 
the forum state as factors to use in order to evaluate the constitutionality of a law under the Due Pro-
cess Clause and the Full Faith and Credit Clause); Hague, 449 U.S. at 308 (articulating the standard to 
judge whether a choice-of-law decision was so arbitrary or fundamentally unfair as to violate the Due 
Process Clause and the Full Faith and Credit Clause); Milton H. Greene, 692 F.3d at 1000 (holding 
that domicile determined the choice of postmortem right of publicity law); Experience Hendrix I, 766 
F. Supp. 2d at 1139–40 (same); Shaw Family Archives, 486 F. Supp. 2d at 314–15 (same); 2 MCCAR-
THY, supra note 28, § 11:17 at 714 (noting that the majority of courts use the domicile state of the 
deceased to determine the existence of a postmortem right of publicity). 
 199 See Shutts, 472 U.S. at 822–23 (holding that the application of Kansas law to a dispute with 
minimal contacts with Kansas violated the Due Process and Full Faith and Credit Clauses); Hague, 
449 U.S. at 308 (stating that the application of a state’s law must not deprive any party of fair notice); 
Milton H. Greene, 692 F.3d at 1000 (holding that the use of domicile to determine the choice of post-
mortem right of publicity law is the majority rule); Experience Hendrix I, 766 F. Supp. 2d at 1139–40 
(same); Shaw Family Archives, 486 F. Supp. 2d at 314 (same); 2 MCCARTHY, supra note 28, § 11:17 
at 714 (stating that the majority rule is for courts to use the deceased’s domicile state when deciding 
which state’s law governs the postmortem right of publicity). 
 200 See CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp., 481 U.S. 69, 88 (1987) (holding that a state statute may not 
adversely affect interstate commerce by subjecting economic activities to inconsistent regulations); 
Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 642–43 (1982) (holding that the Commerce Clause prohibits the 
application of a state statute to commerce that takes place entirely outside of that state’s borders, re-
gardless of whether the commerce has effects within the state); Experience Hendrix I, 766 F. Supp. 2d 
at 1142–43 (ruling that laws governing the postmortem right of publicity unduly burden interstate 
commerce when that right is applied to economic activities taking place out of state); Hawkins, supra 
note 65, at 318–19. 
 201 See Milton H. Greene, 692 F.3d at 1000 (noting that the law of the domicile state determines 
whether a right of publicity descended); Experience Hendrix I, 766 F. Supp. 2d at 1140 (same); Shaw 
Family Archives, 486 F. Supp. 2d at 314 (same); 2 MCCARTHY, supra note 28, § 11:17 at 714 (same). 
But see Robinson, supra note 191, at 204 (arguing the benefits of a federal statutory right of publici-
ty); Vick & Jassy, supra note 86, at 14 (same); Whaley, supra note 191, at 260 (same); Goodman, 
supra note 191, at 227 (same). 
 202 See, e.g., Cairns, 292 F.3d at 1147 (applying the law of the domicile of Princess Diana, Great 
Britain); Acme Circus Operating Co. v. Kuperstock, 711 F.2d 1538, 1541 (11th Cir. 1983) (enforcing 
the law of the domicile of Clyde Beatty, California); Pro Arts, 652 F.2d at 283 (applying the law of 
the domicile of Elvis Presley, Tennessee); see also Rooney, supra note 106, at 933 (stressing the im-
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new challenges concerning the postmortem right of publicity, states should be 
allowed to experiment with novel solutions before imposing untested rules on 
the entire country.203 In addition, each state will be free to adapt to these changes 
without imposition of federal rules that contradict a state’s established legal in-
terpretation of the right of publicity.204 
Although substantive differences in the actual postmortem rights of publici-
ty conferred in different jurisdictions do not undermine the effectiveness of the 
traditional rule, all states should offer certain protections to the laws of other ju-
risdictions.205 First, in order for the traditional rule to retain effectiveness, all 
courts must consistently apply the same law to determine the postmortem right 
of publicity for the same individual.206 For example, not only must courts always 
apply New York law to govern disputes surrounding the postmortem publicity 
rights of someone who died while domiciled in New York, but they also must 
respect prior courts’ factual determinations of that individual’s domicile as New 
York at the time of death.207 Therefore, an ideal state statute governing the post-
mortem right of publicity would contain a provision requiring courts to enforce 
the law of the deceased’s domicile state and prohibiting recognition of that indi-
                                                                                                                           
portance of predictability in the marketplace); Smith, supra note 31, at 1740 (arguing that a lack of 
uniformity in state laws governing the postmortem right of publicity causes uncertainty). 
 203 See New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (not-
ing that individual states may serve as laboratories to try original social and economic experiments 
without affecting the rest of the country); Smith, supra note 31, at 1741–42 (arguing that advances in 
technology may force changes in postmortem right of publicity law). 
 204 See New State Ice Co., 285 U.S. at 311; Smith, supra note 31, at 1735 (noting that courts are 
divided as to the extent that other federal legislation, such as copyright law, preempts state publicity 
laws). 
 205 See Milton H. Greene, 692 F.3d at 1000 (enforcing New York law in a California forum); 
Experience Hendrix I, 766 F. Supp. 2d at 1139–40 (applying New York law in a Washington forum); 
2 MCCARTHY, supra note 28, § 11:17 at 714 (observing that applying the law of the deceased’s domi-
cile state is the only fair and practical rule). 
 206 See Milton H. Greene, 692 F.3d at 1000 (refusing to overturn a previous judicial determination 
of Marilyn Monroe’s domicile); Experience Hendrix I, 766 F. Supp. 2d at 1143 (declining to overturn 
a previous judicial determination of governing law for Jimi Hendrix’s postmortem right of publicity); 
Shaw Family Archives, 486 F. Supp. 2d at 314 (refusing to enforce a different state law from that 
which was previously held to govern Marilyn Monroe’s postmortem right of publicity); 2 MCCAR-
THY, supra note 28, § 11:17 at 714. 
 207 See Milton H. Greene, 692 F.3d at 1000 (holding that Marilyn Monroe’s estate was estopped 
from arguing that she was domiciled in California at death because the estate had previously argued 
that she was domiciled in New York at death); Experience Hendrix I, 766 F. Supp. 2d at 1143 (ruling 
that Jimi Hendrix was domiciled in New York at the time of his death); Shaw Family Archives, 486 
F. Supp. 2d at 314–15 (determining that Marilyn Monroe’s domicile was New York at the time of her 
death); 2 MCCARTHY, supra note 28, § 11:17 at 714 (discussing the traditional rule that the law of an 
individual’s domicile state at the time of death governs whether that individual has a postmortem right 
of publicity). 
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vidual’s domicile state if it would contradict a previous factual determination 
made by another court.208 
An ideal state statute governing the postmortem right of publicity must also 
address changes in the substantive law of the domicile of a deceased individu-
al.209 For example, some state legislatures have responded to court decisions de-
clining to recognize a postmortem right of publicity for individuals who died 
before a jurisdiction recognized such a right by passing laws retroactively con-
ferring the right onto persons who died before a certain date.210 In such situa-
tions, an estate may seek to enforce a deceased individual’s new substantive 
postmortem right of publicity against persons engaged in previously permissible 
activities.211  
Faced with this conflict, a court must balance the interests of the state in 
acting as a laboratory of democracy and responding to its citizens’ desires 
against the expectations of persons engaged in what they correctly believe to be 
legal business activities.212 In order to simultaneously protect both sets of inter-
                                                                                                                           
 208 See Milton H. Greene, 692 F.3d at 1000 (ruling that Marilyn Monroe’s estate was estopped 
from arguing that she died domiciled in California after previously arguing that she died domiciled in 
New York); Experience Hendrix I, 766 F. Supp. 2d at 1143 (holding that the estate of Jimi Hendrix 
was estopped from arguing that he died domiciled in Washington because a court had previously ruled 
that Hendrix died domiciled in New York); 2 MCCARTHY, supra note 28, § 11:15 at 706–07 (empha-
sizing courts’ willingness to enforce the laws of other states with regards to postmortem rights of 
publicity). 
 209 See Milton H. Greene, 692 F.3d at 999 (noting the change in California law prompting Mari-
lyn Monroe’s estate to change its argument as to her domicile); Experience Hendrix I, 766 F. Supp. 2d 
at 1132–33 (observing that the Washington legislature attempted to change Washington’s law so that 
it applied to Jimi Hendrix); 2 MCCARTHY, supra note 28, § 11:15 at 705, 710 (discussing these two 
changes). 
 210 See CAL. CIV. CODE § 3344.1(b), (p) (amending the CRA to cover individuals previously 
uncovered at the time of the statute’s passage); TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-25-1104 (2013) (providing 
that as long as the commercial value of the likeness of a deceased person is exploited at least once every 
two years, the right will never extinguish and pass into the public domain); Milton H. Greene, 692 F.3d 
at 999 (noting that Marilyn Monroe’s estate sought to change its argument as to her domicile state 
after the California legislature amended the CRA to grant a postmortem right of publicity to persons 
who died before January 1, 1985); CBC RADIO, supra note 95 (observing that the California legisla-
ture amended the CRA so that it would apply to individuals who died before its passage). 
 211 See Milton H. Greene, 692 F.3d at 1000 (noting that Marilyn Monroe’s estate was attempting 
to use California law to enjoin the sale of photographs of Marilyn Monroe that were legal under New 
York law); Experience Hendrix I, 766 F. Supp. 2d at 1143 (declining to rule that a change in the 
WPRA supported an injunction of economic activity permitted by New York law); Shaw Family Ar-
chives, 486 F. Supp. 2d at 314–15 (declining to enjoin activity banned by an Indiana statute when that 
activity was protected under New York law); 2 MCCARTHY, supra note 28, § 11:15 at 705 (discussing 
how Marilyn Monroe’s postmortem right of publicity would have changed under California statutory 
amendments had she been domiciled in the state at death). 
 212 See CAL. CIV. CODE § 3344.1(b), (p) (conferring a postmortem right of publicity onto individ-
uals domiciled in the state); TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-25-1103 (same); New State Ice Co., 285 U.S. at 
311 (noting the importance of states as laboratories of democracy); Experience Hendrix I, 766 
F. Supp. 2d at 1143 (holding that the application of the WPRA to Jimi Hendrix was unconstitutional 
because Hendrix died domiciled in New York). 
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ests, an ideal statute governing the postmortem right of publicity would require 
the recognition of changes in the relevant jurisdiction’s substantive law after the 
individual’s death, but prohibit application of those changes to agreements and 
activities commenced prior to the enactment of the changes in the law.213 
CONCLUSION 
A photographer of a world-famous actress finds his most profitable works 
under attack by a statute passed after her death in a state that she never visited. 
The brother of a famous rock star is prohibited from marketing artwork bearing 
the late guitarist’s likeness by a statute amended specifically to do just that. With 
millions of dollars in the balance in these situations and others like them, all 
concerned parties deserve clarity when looking to the law governing their en-
deavors. To solve this problem, the traditional rule of following the law of the 
state in which the deceased was domiciled at time of death should apply in all 
situations. Statutes such as Indiana’s and Washington’s that purport to subvert 
this well-established principle should be discarded because they are unconstitu-
tional. Consistent adherence to the traditional rule would bring predictability to 
this area of the law and would end the uncertainty and frivolous litigation cur-
rently wasting the time and resources of so many businesses and estates. 
ROBERT ROSSI 
                                                                                                                           
 213 See Experience Hendrix I, 766 F. Supp. 2d at 1143 (refusing to enforce the WPRA’s amend-
ments that purported to apply Washington’s postmortem right of publicity to all individuals, regard-
less of domicile); 2 MCCARTHY, supra note 28, § 11:17 at 714 (arguing for predictability in postmor-
tem right of publicity law); Seals, supra note 10 (advising business people to exercise caution when 
engaging in transactions involving the likeness of deceased individuals due to the unpredictability of 
postmortem right of publicity law). 
  
 
